NA by Hardy, Randall W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1972
Japan and nuclear proliferation.
Hardy, Randall W.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/16225













Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for
The Degree of Master of Public Administration
At the University of Washington
Graduate School of Public Affairs
July, 1972
\ V\e




CHAPTER I. PROLIFERATION: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 3
CHAPTER II. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
EVOLUTION AND PROSPECT 14
CHAPTER III. JAPAN'S NUCLEAR CAPACITY 27
CHAPTER IV. THE NATURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY 43
CHAPTER V. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 71
CHAPTER VI. JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 82






On July 1, 1968 the United States signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) , climaxing years of effort to reach an agreement which might
halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty became officially effective
2in March, 1970, and now has been ratified by over sixty nations. Presi-
dent Johnson hailed it as the "most significant step we had yet taken to
3
reduce the possibility of nuclear war," and Soviet leaders were similarly
optimistic. This general euphoria, however, was not felt in all world
capitals. In particular, the NPT ignited a debate in Tokyo which could
have profound implications for Asian and world security. Although Japan
signed the agreement on February 3, 1970, her government officially
4indicated ratification would be contingent on several future developments,
while private sources doubted if the Treaty would ever be ratified.
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 898.
2See Appendix I for a list of those countries which have ratified and those
nations which have only signed the NPT. Since the Treaty only becomes bind-
ing after ratification, a states' signature alone means little more than
support for the spirit of the Treaty. The most important non-signators are
the People's Republic of China, France, India, Indonesia and Israel.
3lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency
1963-1969. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 462.
4
Information Bulletin (Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Informa-
tion Bureau), Vol. XVII, No . 3 , 1970, p. 26.
David K. Willis, "Will Japan Join A-ban?", Christian Science Monitor , Feb.
7, 1970, p. 1. Commenting on Tokyo's signing of the NPT, Willis states
that Japan is expected to postpone Diet ratification for at least two
years and speculates that she may not sign at all. He cites "inside
sources" which predict that chances of ratification are not better than
50-50.

This paper will examine Japanese attitudes on nuclear weapons using
the NPT as a point of departure. The essay will be divided into eight
sections. First, some general aspects of proliferation theory will be
discussed. Second, the Treaty's evolution will be traced and its impact
on Japan and the world will be described. Third, Japan's technical
capacity to produce atomic weapons will be ascertained. Fourth, postwar
Japanese defense policy will be outlined, emphasizing its current threat
posture and illustrating its role in relations with neighboring Asia.
Fifth, Sino-Japanese interactions will be analyzed with particular atten-
tion to China's emerging nuclear capability. Sixth, the peculiar nature
of Japanese-American relations will be explained. Seventh, key elements
of Japan's domestic scene which affect her foreing policy will be identi-
fied. Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn concerning the





The irony of nuclear proliferation is that the "Nth country" tends
to think the problem begins with N + 1. Each nation-state is fearful of
weapon spread to its neighbors but invariably has perfectly unique and
legitimate reasons for acquiring atomic arms itself. Although individual
nuclear decisions point to a variety of imperatives, incentives for such
armaments fall into two basic categories: prestige and security.
Prestige is the less tangible but possibly more powerful of the two
motives. It refers to the political benefits associated with special
weapons which include either a yearning for absolute sovereignty or greater
freedom of action within an existing alliance system. The sheer publicity
given new members of the 'nuclear club, 1 such as China in 1964, has helped
perpetuate the prestige myth. This elusive concept appeals to the desire
of all states for more independence in the world of power politics. It
holds special inducements for countries like Japan which feel their current
political influence, is far from commensurate with their actual position in
the global order. Prestige value accrues to nuclear arms because they not
only indicate a nation's high technological level, economic power and
military might but because they also symbolize the firm resolve of their
possessor to pursue its national interests in the arena of world politics.
Yet supposed prestige gains often obscure the real usefulness of atomic
arsenals since such a capability may alienate nearby non-nuclear countries.
This qualification is especially applicable to a nuclear Japan whose Asian
Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 country,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 39 (April, 1961), 357. This article popularized
references to future nuclear powers as "Nth Countries."

neighbors remember only too well the era of the "Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere."
A second motive for procuring the bomb is security. This concern does
not stem strictly from the military dimension of the international milieu;
more generally, it originates from the phenomenon that as a nation becomes
more involved in world affairs, its stake in a stable global order in-
creases. As the world shifts from a bipolar to a multipolar posture, nations
such as Japan find that past economic and political activities have rendered
them increasingly vulnerable to the play of external forces. This realiza-
tion often causes these countries to question whether previously valid
security assurances are sufficient to cover their expanded national inter-
ests. While this atmosphere of uncertainty grows, atomic devices become
gradually more attractive as an alternative to existing security arrangements.
The problem is that security guarantees are not simple undertakings
for the protector to act in a particular way. They are commitments which
are believed both by the possible aggressor and by the country fearing
attack. Of necessity, such commitments are as much a feeling of mutual
confidence as an overt treaty declaration. Their possible erosion is the
product of today's multipolar environment plus the failure of any nation
to make a predicable and exact science of deterrence. In the early Cold
War years, Japan and other states backed certain allies largely because
they had no other alternative. But today such countries are materially
stronger and face a world where the opportunities to wield their new in-
fluence are considerably greater.
If the diffusion of world power enhances the appeal of nuclear weapons,
their horizontal propagation is likewise a function of the superpowers own

vertical arms race. For instance, a further Soviet-American buildup pres-
sures China to construct more bombs to achieve a credible second strike
capability. Growth of the Chinese threat, in turn, further destabilizes
the international atmosphere in which an Nth country must operate. One
indirect method of providing security guarantees to potential nuclear
powers is genuine progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or
similar superpower agreements.
A final inducement for atomic arsenals can be found in the ambivalent
nature of a strong bipolar alliance. In one sense* assurances under such
a system contain the best of two worlds: the greatest security before
nuclear development and some promise of support even after starting con-
struction.
This de facto support would be especially important in the new nation's
first years of weapon manufacture. During the period of initial production,
considerable incentives would exist for the intended enemy to preempt his
adversary's capability before his adversary attained a deterrent posture.
The tacit support, at least, of the Nth country's old protector might be
necessary to reduce such a possibility.
Even with outside assistance, the strategic vulnerability of any
system often reduces its effectiveness. Some prominent Japanese have
described nuclear arms as a "beautiful dream" for precisely this reason
while others have contended that, against a country lacking sophisticated
air defense, even B-52's suffice as an adequate delivery mechanism. An
John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power . The Japanese Dilemma (New York:
Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 355. The quote is from a
1970 statement by Kaihara Osamu, chief of the secretariat of the National
Defense Council.

effective means of retaliation must also meet the changing demands placed
upon it by the aggressor. Missiles which the emerging power learns about
after a time lag, and develops after a further time lag, are not likely to
be relevant to their initial purpose. The possibility of this continual
development gap poses two additional problems. First, the Nth country will
be faced with spiraling costs for weapons the benefits of which are not
necessarily apparent to its citizenry. Next, the potential atomic power
will be unable to achieve quickly a position of mutual deterrence vis-a-vis
its probable opponent, simply prolonging the new state's initial period of
extreme vulnerability to political or military preemptive action by its rival,
Despite the above considerations, the essence of Japan's nuclear
dilemma appears to reside in her current Security Treaty with the United
States. By this agreement, Washington extended the American nuclear
umbrella over Tokyo, and the credibility of this deterrent must be the focus
for any discussion of Japanese rearmament. The credibility question hinges
on the assumption that a nation's adversaries and allies believe, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that it has both the will and the physical capacity to
use its atomic arsenal. The United States must appear willing to do the
very thing it wants most to avoid or its guarantees are essentially meaning-
less.
American guarantees, as viewed by many long-time allies, have been
progressively diluted during the postwar years. From Dulles' massive
retaliation to MacNamara's flexible response to the Nixon Doctrine, the
United States has gradually altered its strategic posture according to its
perceptions of global realities. To a powerful America, such action means
a more flexible foreign policy but, to an apprehensive Japan, these changes

may imply a loss of will to defend what were previously regarded as common
interests in Asia. Japan has yet to question openly the basic integrity
of the United States' nuclear deterrent because doing so might destroy the
entire fabric of her present security structure. Nevertheless, doubts con-
cerning the long-term prospects of a one-way American security guarantee to
Japan clearly underlie official Japanese statements regarding the defense
alliance.
The Nixon Doctrine thus has profound implications for Japan since
reducing the United States' presence in Asia makes the entire credibility
issue painfully immediate. Withdrawal from Vietnam, the return of a nuclear-
free Okinawa to Japan, and force reductions throughout the Far East are
substantive actions reflecting American intentions which have heightened
Japanese anxiety over their country's future. Although Washington has
acknowledged that some relationship exists between its forces in Japan and
o
the validity of the United States' deterrent, absolute troop levels
frequently lose their significance in light of a continued trend toward their
eventual pullout. American defense strategy for the 1970 's merely confirms
this tendency. In the words of Secretary Laird:
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Okinawa, Hearings
,
testimony of Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson before a sub-
committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on the Okinawa
Reversion Treaty, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 1262. Sec. Johnson, a
former ambassador to Japan, stated that the United States' presence in
Japan gave visible evidence of the American commitment and therefore in-
hibited Japanese desires to acquire nuclear weapons. During the same
testimony, he also said that reduction of American bases in Japan was a
product of the Nixon Doctrine under which individual countries were to
assume more of their own defense burdens.

The strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would
dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new
packaging would be quite mistaken. . .we have said, and I would
repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the
world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are
rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more
effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom
should be shared more fully by our allies and friends.
9
The disquieting fact about burden-sharing in Asia are its inferences
as the People's Republic of China (PRC) expands her nuclear might. Should
the Chinese achieve a second strike capability against the United States,
what would be the consequences for Japan? In strategic parlance, would
Seattle, San Francisco or Los Angeles make better hostage cities than
Tokyo or Osaka? On the surface, it would appear that a Chinese capability
to strike the American heartland would greatly diminish current security
assurances to Japan. Although Peking's ability to administer an un-
acceptable level of damage would not completely neutralize the United
States' deterrent, it would likely lessen Washington's support for Tokyo
in the event of a political or even military confrontation with the PRC.
The defense of Japan itself is not the point in question. Because of her
economic strength, industrial capacity and geographic location, Japan is
sufficiently important to insure that the American deterrent would continue
to counter any direct Chinese threat to the home islands. But in othei
areas in the Far East, where Japan's economic, political and prestige in-
vestments transcend those of the United States, American willingness to
9
Melvin R. Laird, Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence (Washington.
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 1.
A contrary argument is presented by Walter B. Wentz in Nuclear Pro-
liferation (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 72.

risk even a single population center would become at best doubtful. While
such developments have not been lost on the Japanese, " even the most out-
spoken advocates of an independent nuclear force must weigh the probability
that the United States' deterrent will not be used against the assured use
of their own arsenal but its doubtful effectiveness.
Besides these strategic considerations, various economic factors also
influence the diffusion of atomic devices. The tremendous investments of
money and manpower required for any nuclear program serve as passive con-
straints on those countries desiring a weapon capacity. Yet an important
development over the last decade has been the gradual lowering of techno-
logical barriers, at least to acquisition of a token force, for a variety
of reasons. First, the spread of technical information about atomic energy
has greatly increased. Through the United Nations' conferences on the
peaceful uses of atomic power and numerous scientific contacts among all
See, for example, Yonosuke Nagai, "Security and Independence as National
Goals," Chuo Koron (July, 1966) in Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines
(hereafter Summaries ) , U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, September 19, 1966, p. 21.
Although somewhat exaggerated, Nagai's article expresses the legitimate fears
of many Japanese statesmen and intellectuals by complaining:
So long as China's nuclear fighting power is negligible,
the United States can choose to protect the countries
around China. In the stage where China's nuclear
fighting power raises a threat to the United States it-
self, however, Asian peace and security solely depend
on China's moves and intent. This is tantamount to
allowing Chinese diplomacy to hold the power of life
and death. Japanese peace and security will be left
to the mercy of China.

10
nations, the world's general knowledge of nuclear techniques has steadily
improved. Next, atomic power appears to be the wave of the future for
industrial areas with high population densities. The continuing reduction
of organic fuel reserves, the growing danger of air pollution from combus-
tion of such fuels, the low transportation costs of nuclear energy and its
potential use for desalinization are all strong incentives for commercial
nuclear programs. Finally, largely as a result of the previous two develop-
ments, actual costs of arms procurement are decreasing. In their 1967
report to Secretary-General U Thant, a group of United Nations consultant
12
experts predicted a "modest" nuclear program would cost only $1.7 billion.
Even this figure was expected to drop as technology spread and large-scale
power projects would reduce capital investments and operating costs in the
atomic field. The report estimated that "by 1980 there would be in the
world more than 3 X 10 megawatts (Mwe) of nuclear power production. This
would involve the production of plutonium sufficient for thousands of bombs
13
each year." As will be shown later, a generous portion of this anticipated
generating capacity will belong to Japan.
Intertwined with these economic issues is the problem of distinguishing
between the peaceful and military applications of atomic power. Countries
12
U.S., Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents
on Disarmament 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968),
pp. 501-502. The entire report dealt with the blast effects, economic
implications and security implications of nuclear weapons. In this con-
text, "modest" represented a force of "thirty to fifty bomber aircraft, to-
gether with fifty medium-range missiles of the 3,000 kilometer range in
soft emplacements and 100 plutonium warheads." The total cost of $1.7
billion was figured as being spread over ten years, with an annual procure-







with large civilian power programs are already well down the road to weapon
acquisition as it appears impossible to identify that point where clear
evidence of military intent exists. The ambiguous nature of this process
simply aids potential nuclear powers. Japan, for example, justifies her
accelerated construction of power reactors as mandatory to meet future
energy requirements, knowing full well that such action also increases her
latent capability for weapon manufacture. So long as present atomic
arsenals form part of their political environment and, therefore, their
calculations, Japan and other near-nuclear governments will be unlikely to
abandon technical options they currently possess.
A factor which further obscures the peaceful-military dividing line
is the traditional web of secrecy surrounding weapon activity. Any public
discussion of an impending nuclear decision is usually suppressed for two
reasons: First, the subject's extreme sensitivity would arouse considerable
domestic turmoil; second, such a debate would probably have divisive
effects on neighboring governments. The result is often that a handful of
administrators, politicians and technocrats are able to steer a nuclear
program ever closer to weapon production. When the time arrives for a
definite decision, project momentum is sufficiently established that it
would require a very determined government to halt manufacture. An
additional advantage of this strategy is in presenting possible opponents
—
foreign and domestic—with a virtual fait accompli.
Despite these somewhat gloomy prospects, there have been some past
14
successes in arms control. The NPT, Limited Test Ban Treaty and the
14
Although not originally so conceived, the Test Ban Treaty may be the
world's most significant non-proliferation measure to date. The experience
of the five nuclear powers has shown that any nation trying to develop

12
treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space are the prime examples of
limited super-power cooperation to keep a measure of control over the
global pattern of events. Yet a characteristic common to all the arrange-
ments was the failure of two nuclear nations, France and China, to adhere
to them.
Future directions of proliferation contain a wide variety of options.
At one end of the spectrum, a comprehensive test ban, a freeze on delivery
systems, a cut-off of fissile material production and nuclear-free zones
are the most frequently discussed measures in the United Nations. In con-
trast, selective proliferation proposals similar to the defunct Multi-
lateral Force (MLF) concept for Western Europe also have some attractive
features. Proponents of this latter view see a MLF or some type of anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) system as the only means of retaining American
deterrent credibility in particular countries. Such a sharing arrange-
ment for Japan would theoretically buttress current guarantees but in
practice might prove to be counterproductive. It would generate in-
stability both in her internal politics and in her relations with Asia
while remaining geographically vulnerable to the very threat it was
designed to counter.
In one sense, the future of proliferation depends on the implementa-
tion of an existing agreement— the NPT. This Treaty was the most recent
step toward arms control. Although widely hailed by both Americans and
atomic arms will find it extremely difficult, both technically and finan-
cially, to start testing fission devices anywhere but in the atmosphere.
Given their current state of the art, all but the most advanced countries
would have difficulty even exploding a crude weapon underground much less
producing the detailed blast and yield data necessary for military purposes






Soviets, it was embraced with considerably less enthusiasm by potential
nuclear nations. The Treaty's central assumption is that the possibility
of nuclear war is reduced by stopping weapon propagation. Implicit in this
rationale is the idea that proliferation is a determinant of the inter-
national environment rather than a reflection of the distrust and hostility
already present in that environment and that weapons themselves are the
source, instead of mere agents, of world discord. Such inverse logic gives
the NPT little chance for success; it is an artificial means to deal with
the political and technical complexities of weapon spread. A successful
international treaty reflects reality but does not produce reality. Basic-
ally a superpower attempt to legislate the future of Nth countries, the
NPT will be hard pressed to produce a lasting consensus on many points




THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
EVOLUTION AND PROSPECT
After four years of negotiation, the NPT was opened for signature on
1 ft
July 1, 1968, and subsequently entered into force on March 5, 1970. Its
functional articles can be summarized as follows:
Article I - Nuclear states pledge not to transfer
atomic weapons to non-nuclear nations or to
encourage those nations to acquire special weapons.
Article II - Non-nuclear countries undertake re-
ciprocal obligations neither to receive nor to
acquire atomic arms.
Article III - Procedures are established for each
nation to negotiate safeguards with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . The object
of such safeguards is to prevent the diversion of
fissionable material from peaceful uses to
weapons manufacture.
Article IV - Nothing in the Treaty will hinder non-
nuclear states from full development of peaceful
atomic energy.
Article V - Each nuclear power will insure that
any benefits from the peaceful application of
nuclear explosions are made available to non-
nuclear powers.
Article VI - Each nuclear power will pursue
"negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date. "17
Article VIII - Amendments can only be passed by a
majority of all Parties to the Treaty which must
include the approval of all nuclear states and all
current members of the IAEA Board of Governors.
There will be a review conference every five years
to consider possible revisions.










Article X - Any Party will "have the right to with-
draw from the Treaty if it decides extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeoparidized the supreme interests of
its country. "18 Such notice must be given three
months in advance. Also, tiie Treaty will have an
initial twenty-five year life span.
Although any analysis must necessarily focus on the Treaty's substance,
it is still helpful to compare this result with previously proposed drafts.
Several articles in the final Treaty were included only at the vehement
behest of non-nuclear nations. Guarantees for unimpaired civilian atomic
19
programs, assurances about the "spinoff" benefits ' of nuclear explosive
devices, five year review conferences and the twenty-five year Treaty
duration were all superpower concessions to Nth country demands. Addi-
tionally, the nuclear power pledge to further arms control progress (i.e.
SALT) was incorporated as Article VI from its initial position in the
Treaty preamble. The content of these changes may not be earthshaking,






For Japan's attitude, see Ryukichi Imai, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty
and Japan," Survival
,
XI (September, 1969), 283. An atomic energy con-
sultant to the Foreign Ministry, Imai contends that the immediate spinoff
benefits from weapon-oriented research and development (R & D) are
exaggerated but that the long-term problem is valid: Military R & D is
unfortunately the best and often the only means for national investment
nuclear R&D activities. Unless there is a military purpose for con-
ducting such research, the large initial investment and slowly realized
returns will likely prohibit profit-seeking private capital from under-
taking necessary research projects. Imai cites several examples to prove
his point: Gas graphite reactors are an outgrowth of plutonium production
facilities; light water reactors (LWR) are offsprings of submarine pro-
pulsion studies; the development of uranium enrichment for commercial use
came only after the five nuclear powers spent billions in perfecting this




Soviet-American disagreements over safeguards and the MLF, Treaty negoti-
ating history, was characterized by a nuclear state versus non-nuclear state
alignment on issues.
To alleviate this have-have not dichotomy, the United States made two
specific offers. First, on December 2, 1967, President Johnson announced
that the United States would not ask any country to accept safeguards which
Washington itself was unwilling to accept. When safeguards have been
applied under the Treaty, America would permit the IAEA "to apply its safe-
guards to all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those
21
with direct national security significance." " This initiative was coupled
22
with a similar British offer in an effort to dispel Nth country reserva-
tions that Treaty safeguards would impinge on their sovereignty and that
submission to safeguards risked revelation of commercial nuclear secrets.
The second American step was a joint declaration of security assurances,
undertaken in concert with Moscow and London, to support non-nuclear powers
23
threatened by atomic attack. It pledged the three nations, through the
20
This controversy alone stalled NPT negotiations during much of the mid-
1960' s. The American position held that MLF would not violate the Treaty
since control of any force weapons would still reside with the United
States. The Soviets maintained that physical transfer of nuclear arms,
regardless of who had the trigger, was unacceptable. The conflict quietly






p. 615. The United States Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) has subsequently stated that the Johnson pledge could in-
volve about 200 facilities of six different types , (research reactors, power








Documents on Disarmament , 1968 . pp. 439-440. See Appendix II for text.
Ambassador Goldberg read the American declaration to the Security Council
on June 17, 1968. The U.K. and Soviet representatives presented sub-
stantially identical resolutions on the same date.

17
U.N. Security Council, to counter effectively any nuclear actions taken or
threatened against a Treaty signator. Given the Security Council's past
peacekeeping record, such assurances appear questionable to endangered Nth
countries. Their shortcoming is common to all United Nations' efforts at
collective security among the major international competitors; there are
virtually no shared interests requiring the use of force that can be relied
upon to prevail over individual national interests.
In view of the above background, why did the United States work so
vigorously for Treaty acceptance? The acknowledged answers varied according
to the audience addressed. For domestic political consumption, both at
home and abroad, Washington emphasized two points: First, that the Treaty
would save potential nuclear powers the tremendous opportunity and absolute
costs of atomic arsenals and prevent subsequent economic dislocation;
second, that the NPT would halt a kind of geometric progression from the
growth of plutonium production to weapon spread to the increased risks of
24
local nuclear conflicts and their inevitable escalation into world war.
This latter argument, although not based on any rigorous calculation of
weapons use probabilities, is quite plausible to American, Japanese and
world public opinion. Most citizens, appalled by the prospect that nuclear
weapons might ever be used, share a powerful intuition that with fewer
possessors of atomic arms the chances of nuclear war will be significantly
less. Although unable to be proved or disproved, 'this reasoning seems
24
An excellent example of this explanation of the NPT is found in an August,
1966, interview of Secretary McNamara in a Japanese magazine. See Depart-
ment of State Bulletin
, Vol. IV, August 29, 1966, pp. 304-305 ff.

18
sound and was no doubt shared by most government leaders. Despite Its
compelling logic, however, this explanation was not Washington's primary
motive for promoting the NPT.
In addressing the Congress, Dean Rusk hinted at a justification more
in line with an unemotional assessment of American national interests. The
Treaty was beneficial because it reduced the number of potential nuclear
customers among Nth countries, and it prevented potential atomic powers
25
from ever acquiring special weapons despite a future capability to do so.
Rusk's explanation underlies the basic reason for Soviet-American co-
operation on the NPT: Such an agreement would prevent the diffusion of
atomic bombs to potential opponents without conceding either power's nuclear
superiority. Each superpower presently enjoys a fiscal and industrial base
which is almost beyond challenge by non-nuclear states. These material
assets have been readily translated into political and military power un-
equaled in the modern world. As indicated by the label "superpower,"
Moscow and Washington dwarf their nearest competitors in the game of world
politics and consequently possess considerable freedom of action in dealing
with lesser nations. When a country becomes a nuclear power, however, this
7 ft
situation is fundamentally changed. In a sense, fission weapons are the
great equalizers; they may not close the development gap, but they sharply
circumscribe American or Soviet power. Even without a sophisticated
delivery system, nuclear arms abruptly alter the previous relationship
25
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Hearings
,
testimony of Secretary of
State Dean Rusk before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on the
NPT, 90th Cong. 2nd sess., 1968, p. 32. Hereafter cited as Hearings , 90th
Cong.
7 ft
For a contrary view, see W. C. Foster in "New Directions in Arms Control
and Disarmament," Foreign Affairs Vol. 43 (July, 1965), 587-601.

19
between the United States or the Soviet Union and their new possessor. In
short, they will probably upset the old status quo which was mutually bene-
ficial to both superpowers.
The NPT was primarily an effort to institutionalize a status quo based
on the simple bipolarism of the early 1960's. If the present situation is
threatening to a state's security or national interest, that nation is not
likely to sanction the status quo by international treaty; in the multipolar
world of the 1970's most countries are especially reluctant to make such a
commitment. Instead, many nations, particularly those states with sub-
stantial material assets, will take a wait-and-see attitude. They will
maintain this deliberately ambiguous posture in order to build up their
strength quietly, challenging the status quo only when they are capable or
when the perceived threat reaches an intolerable level.
Although Nth countries perceived varying threat levels, all felt they
were victims of nuclear power discrimination. The NPT was widely criti-
cized as a treaty to limit the spread of atomic powers rather than an
27
agreement to stop the proliferation of atomic weapons. Its signing was
assailed as being little more than a pious great power pledge to refrain
from doing what neither power would have done in any event. Particularly
irksome was American hypocrisy in evoking the sake of all mankind as a
reason for denying to others that which the United States considered vital
to its own security.
27
Elizabeth Young, The Control of Proliferation : The 1968 Treaty in Hind-
sight and Forecast
,
Adelphi Paper No. 56 (London: Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1969), pp. 11-12. Somewhat more colorful was French Defense




These general feelings were reflected by specific strategic. and tech-
nical objections to the Treaty. The strategic complaints focused on security
guarantees and superpower arms control progress. In the former case, the
American joint Resolution was branded as a mere statement of intent instead
of a declaration of assured action. Since it simply reiterated the peace-
28
keeping function of the Security Council, " the Resolution offered little
incentive for non-nuclear powers to sign the NPT, perpetuating their con-
viction that the Treaty entailed sacrifices of their security not balanced
by concessions made or obligations undertaken by the nuclear nations. For
29
Japan, such reservations are sustained by Peking s recent admission to
the United Nations and seat on the Security Council. With Tokyo's prin-
cipal Asian competitor exercising a veto overall motions before the Council,
the American joint Resolution is a dead letter.
Aside from security considerations, apprehension over the superpowers'
own arms race characterized Nth country comments. India, Japan and others
2 Q
See Testimony of Secretary Rusk, Hearings
,
90th Cong., p. 16. Rusk con-
firmed non-nuclear powers' beliefs by testifying that the joint security
Resolution did not commit the United States to any obligation beyond those
already assumed under the U.N. Charter.
29
For reaction to the joint Resolution by all Japan's political parties;
see Mainichi Shimbun
,
March 9, 1968, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press
(hereafter Daily) , U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, March 9-11, 1968, pp. 22-23.
Comment ranged from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) lukewarm
endorsement (that the measure was a necessary, but not sufficient, con-
dition for guaranteeing Nth country security) , to the Japanese Communist
Party's (JCP) outright rejection of the initiative. More importantly, both
the LDP and all Opposition statements mentioned the Chinese threat, imply-
ing that the resolution was not adequate to cope with possible mainland
actions. These announcements also came three years before Peking's admis-
sion to the United Nations further degraded the Resolution's security value,

21
criticized Washington and the Kremlin for pushing the NPT as a substitute
for genuine progress in disarmament negotiations. They charged that Treaty
limits on horizontal spread without complementary checks on vertical dis-
persion constituted a type of indirect discrimination. The United States
replied that this dichotomy was absolutely necessary lest the NPT be hope-
lessly confused by issues unique to the American-Soviet situation.
A third reservation also underlay statements on the NPT by potential
atomic powers. Although its purely military nature prevented open comment,
Treaty prohibition of "defensive" nuclear arms severely circumscribed Nth
30
country opportunities for self-defense. By adhering to the Treaty such
nations would deny themselves the future option of acquiring ABM's and
consequently forfeit ultimate control over their destiny. Particularly
for a nation technically capable of eventual ABM manufacture, foreclosing
the option by participation in the NPT is an alarming thought.
Non-nuclear state uneasiness was also mirrored in technical objections
to the Treaty. Already mentioned were Articles IV and V, included specific-
ally to ensure equal distribution of atomic energy's peaceful benefits.
Yet safeguard issues surrounding Article III were by far the most trouble-
some. The amount of technical information required by the IAEA must be
detailed if control is to be realistic, but methods of obtaining such inti-
mate knowledge are characteristically instrusive. Amid fears of industrial
tor a most persuasive argument of this point, see the testimony of Dr.
Edward Teller, Hearings
,
90th Cong., pp. 185-186. Teller criticized the NPT
for denying Nth countries the inviolable right of self defense. He also
maintained that it was possible, or would be possible in the near future, to
design purely defensive nuclear weapons using electronic safeguards and war-




espionage and preferential application of safeguards, Article III was
born, giving all non-nuclear signators a two-year period in which to negoti-
32
ate individual safeguard agreements with the IAEA. This organization
established a Safeguard Committee in April, 1970, which produced a set of
33
model guidelines for all countries to follow in subsequent negotiations
31
This charge was leveled against the European Atomic Energy Commission
(EURATOM) by India, Japan and others. The dispute involved EURATOM's con-
tention that its existing intercountry inspection system obviated the .need
to submit to IAEA inspections. Individual states subject to IAEA safe-
guards protested that the in-house nature of EURATOM checks meant its con-
trols would likely be less stringent.
32
The two year negotiating period began when the Treaty entered into force
on March 5, 1970. The Treaty is unclear as to what happens to those Nth
countries failing to conclude safeguard arrangements by March 5, 1972.
33
Ryukichi Imai, et al . "Safeguards: Five Views," International Atomic
Energy Agency Bulletin
,
Vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), 2-13. In its final report of
April, 1971, the Committee recommended the following basic guidelines:
1) The IAEA should count on independent verification
and authentication (i.e. spot checks) of data
recorded by national accountability systems.
2) IAEA inspectors would use a "strategic points"
concept, confining their activities to pre-
selected portions of nuclear plants where the
amounts of fissionable material could be most
easily measured.
3) For inspection purposes, atomic facilities
would be divided into three classes, specifying
the maximum quantity of effort, (expressed in
man-days or man-years of inspection time) for
each type of plant. This system would mean
modest facilities such as research reactors
would only require a single, annual inspection
while highly strategic plants (i.e. commercial
reprocessing or fuel fabrication plants) would
be subject to nearly continuous surveillance.
4) IAEA inspectors would avoid compromising com-
mercial secrets and would refrain from unneces-
sary interference in plant operations.

23
with the Agency. Although these recommendations were readily adopted by
34
several nations, Japan, West Germany and other non-nuclear countries
35
remained apprehensive about the final form of Article III safeguards.
In one sense Article III shows the dilemma of the entire NPT: Any
successful disarmament treaty must be formulated in terms which are more
than mere rehetorical gestures or promises for further negotiations but
which are flexible enough to accommodate a broad spectrum of national
attitudes and interests. Since these considerations are the product of
each country's external security interests and internal domestic factors,
matching this heterogeneous mixture is nearly impossible. The vague com-
promises which result satisfy few countries, especially nations with
advanced industrial economies. These powers must be convinced their
security and other national interests are enhanced before they will sign
the NPT. In essence, they must perceive a more efficient threat reduction,
without serious economic disadvantages, through Treaty membership than
34
U.S., Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eleventh
Annual Report to Congress
,
(January 1, 1971-December 31, 1971) (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 16. During 1971, Austria,
Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Uruguay all concluded safe-
guards agreements with the IAEA. Negotiations are currently underway with
EURATOM, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and others.
35
See, for instance, Ryukichi Imai, "Japan and the World of Salt," Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientist
,
XXVII (December , 1971), 16. As Japan's negotiator
on the Safeguards Committee, Imai acknowledges some progress toward imple-
menting Article III in a manner compatible with the needs of peaceful
nuclear industry. Yet he laments the Committee's excessive concern with
purely military uses of atomic energy, fearing that some measures to guard
against the diversion of fissionable material were adopted at the expense
of steps to improve nuclear technology. In Imai's words, "It is something
like an attempt to prohibit the use of the plough because it may be trans-
formed into a sword."
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than through other options open to them; the NPT must offer improved security
at less cost, in terms of manpower, money and national prestige, then inde-
pendent actions such as nuclear rearmament programs. The myriad of Nth
country criticisms, both strategic and technical, indicates substantial
doubt concerning Treaty ability to fulfill the above requirements, and no-
where are these reservations better demonstrated than in official Japanese
comments during the Treaty's evolution.
In a speech to the Japanese Diet on March 14, 1967, and in an address
37
to the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1967 Foreign Minister Miki
stressed the same points. Japan favored the "spirit" of the NPT, but the
Treaty needed improvement: Stronger security guarantees by nuclear to non-
nuclear states were essential; the superpowers should take genuine steps
toward disarmament; treaty provisions should not obstruct the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.
Subsequent Japanese statements at the United Nations put forth more
specific proposals to achieve some of these ends and repeated Japan's
anxiety about others. Ambassador Tsuruoka's speech of May 10, 1968, hailed
the joint U. S.-U.K.-U.S. S.R. security resolution as "a step in the right
direction" but warned that it would not "altogether eliminate the fears of
38
non-nuclear-weapon states regarding their security problems." This
declaration also suggested a comprehensive test ban to boost disarmament
progress, simple and uniform safeguards to avoid hampering civilian fission
activities and a five-year review conference to adjust the Treaty in accord-
















expressed similar reservations at home, but there it additionally emphasized
every signator's right, under Article X, to withdraw from the Treaty if
that nation's "supreme interests" were jeopardized. Just what actions might
endanger Japan's interests were left purposefully vague, but one was gener-
ally acknowledged to be unilateral American abrogation of the Security
39
Treaty.
These complaints by Japan illustrate the main flaw of the NPT: It
40
fails to provide adequate security guarantees for threshold nuclear
powers. Botswana, Nepal and the Maldives will sign the Treaty because they
do not currently possess, nor entertain hopes of ever possessing, the tech-
nical capacity to sustain a nuclear weapons program. Although Canada and
Sweden have the physical requisites, their special security positions like-
wise enable them to adhere. For India, Japan and Israel, however, NPT
participation entails few gains and many potential risks. These countries
have the capability for weapon manufacture while being simultaneously con-
fronted by hostile neighbors. They are understandably reluctant to renounce
their technical option for a Treaty which treats the symptoms of inter-
national instability—armaments—instead of its causes—distrust, territorial/
political ambitions and perceptions of threat. So long as their environment
remains unfriendly, these nations will not commit themselves to a permanent
non-nuclear status. The NPT will fail to restrain those very powers for
whom it was primarily intended.
39
Tokyo Shimbun
, February 4, 1970 in Daily , February 5, 1970, p. 3.
40,
"Threshold" powers as used here identifies those countries which presently
have the technical capacity to manufacture atomic arms. This group is




Despite being those of a leading threshold nation, Japan's criticisms
of the NPT are similar in content and tone to those of lesser Nth countries.
They outwardly reflect nothing unique about Japan's concern for equal
treatment or for adequate security assurances under the Treaty. Yet Tokyo's
situation is most definitely without parallel among the near-nuclear powers.
Her industrial capacity, her position in Asia and her domestic scene contain
elements which interact in peculiar and potentially unpredictable ways. The
irony of Asia in the 1970 's is that the NPT may become the catalytic factor
in Japan's nuclear equation. The product of this equation hinges upon how
its dependent variables—industry, security and domestic politics—ulti-
mately relate to the Treaty. In this regard, it is first necessary to




Any potential nuclear power must surmount two technical obstacles be-
fore it can possess a useful weapon capability: The first is to acquire
atomic warheads which are light enough, small enough and sufficiently re-
liable to accomplish their mission; the second is to procure an effective
means of delivering them against desired targets. Critical to both these
problems is a large bureaucratic apparatus capable of managing the intri-
cate components associated with a nuclear development effort and a high
41level of research and development (R&D) investment in atomic energy.
The first problem is usually the more difficult, and always the more
misunderstood, of the two. A nuclear explosion involves bringing together
swiftly critical masses of one of two fissionable isotopes; naturally occur-
ring uranium, U - 235, or Pu-239. U-235 exists in concentrations of about
0.7 per cent in the usual isotope of uranium, U-238. Before uranium can be
used as a weapon, this proportion must be increased to over 90 percent of
U-235 in a specialized enrichment plant. The two methods for producing
U-235 of this quality are gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge. Both are
based on the same technique for transforming uranium into a gaseous form
(uranium hexafluoride - UF,) and then separating lighter molecules from
heavier ones. By repeating this process thousands of times, it is possible
gradually to concentrate the U-235. Gaseous diffusion accomplishes this
separation by diffusing the UF, gas through a series of membranes which
41
Arnold Kramish, "The Emergent Genie," in The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons
Strategy and Politics
,
ed. by R. N. Rosecrance (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1964), p. 265. Kramish estimates that to achieve the "techno-
logical maturity level" necessary to support a nuclear capability requires
an annual research and development investment of 0.5 per cent of a country's
GNP for several years.
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transmit the lighter molecules, rich in U-235, more readily than the heavier
molecules, rich in U-238. Because of the number of membrane stages necessary for
42
significant enrichment and because of the quantity of ancillary equipment
they require, gaseous diffusion plants are extremely large, consume enormous
amounts of electric power and must operate at a very high level of capacity
to remain economical. For these reasons, they are beyond the capability of
all but the most industrialized societies.
In a gas centrifuge, separation is accomplished by rotating UF, at a
high speed so the heavier atoms tend to concentrate around the periphery.
43
Although difficulties with centrifuge technology have precluded its in-
44
dustrial use, this process holds significant future possibilities. Its
45
cost is independent of plant size at low capacities; it uses smaller amounts
of electricity, and it requires a lower manning level than a gaseous diffusion
plant. These advantages would be especially attractive to potential nuclear
42
C. F. Barnaby, ed., Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London:
Pugwash Monograph I. Souvenir Press, 1969), p. 5. The average gaseous dif-
fusion plant requires between 2000-4000 screens, each situated in a leak-
proof chamber under very high pressure.
43
The main difficulty lies in regulating the behavior of UF inside the




p. 254. In the opinion of Dr. Barnaby, head of
the British Pugwash Group, "The possible development of gas centrifuges is,
in fact, one of the factors most likely to lead to proliferation at the
present time, particularly because the technology of centrifuges is probably
capable of significant improvement whereas there is probably no large factor
of improvement to be expected from G^s diffusion methods."
45
J. Beckman. "Gas Centrifuges for Cheaper Isotope Separation," in Nuclear
Weapons, ed. by Barnaby p. 97. The crossover point where gas centrifuges
would have operating costs equal to gaseous diffusion plants occurs at a
production level of 200 kg. of U-235 per year. A capital cost reduction of
five times or better can be attained with gas centrifuges whose output is
100 kg of U-235 per year or less.
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powers wishing to conduct a more economical, possibly clandestine, weapons
46
program than is feasible with large-scale gaseous diffusion operations.
The second kind of bomb production involves the separation of Pu-239
produced as a byproduct during atomic power generation. The fission of
47
enriched uranium fuel releases an excess of neutrons which are captured
by the otherwise unusable U-238, transforming it into Pu-239 at the rate of
48
one kilogram per megawatt of energy per year. Before it can be used for
any purpose, Pu-239 must be extracted, in a specialized fuel reprocessing
plant, from the fuel elements which have been irradiated in a reactor.
Once Pu-239 is in a nation's inventory, the only additional steps necessary
are machining it to an explosive configuration and designing a triggering
mechanism.
The advantages of the plutonium route to nuclear weapons are the avail-
ability of information and economies of scale. An alternate and more
46
Japan has been conducting a vigorous gas centrifuge program for several
years. After its initial success in 1969, Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear
Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) plans to start test production of enriched
uranium by centrifuge this year. Indigenous centrifuge facilities are pre-
sently capable of making twenty kilograms of 1.4% enriched uranium per year.
Asahi Shimbun
, January 21, 1972 in Daily , January 25, 1972, p. 1.
47
U-235 used to fuel power reactors is only 2-4% enriched as compared with
the 90% enrichment necessary to produce a U-235 weapon. For a diagram of
the plutonium production process, see Appendix III.
48
Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread ? (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin
Books, Ltd. 1966), p. 91.
49
With her highly sophisticated precision instrument and electronics in-
dustries, Japan would have little difficulty in completing this final step
of weapon construction. See Junnosuke Kishida, "Concerning Nuclear Armament
of Japan," Kokubo
,
(July, 1967) in Summaries
,
January 29 - February 5, 1968,




efficient method of plutonium production is to construct a so-called breeder
50
reactor which produces plutonium at a rate of 3 kg/mwe/yr. Since the
breeder produces about four times the plutonium it consumes " and decreases
the amount of non-fissionable plutonium isotopes in reactor byproducts, it
promises to generate electricity cheaply enough to compete commercially with
coal and oil. Although prototype breeders are just beginning to operate,
plans for their future development can justify current construction of
plutonium separation plants. Nth countries can use their reprocessing
plants to stockpile weapon grade plutonium ostensibly for fueling a future
generation of breeders, thus further blurring any distinction between
military and civilian uses of atomic energy. With a mere seven kg. of Pu-239
52
comprising a critical mass, this development alone would constitute a
major step toward a weapons capability.
In view of the above requisites, what is Japan's potential for manu-
facturing atomic devices? After a slow start, Japanese research and
development programs in all fields are now accelerating rapidly. The original
53
lag was due to extensive technological "borrowing," via licensing arrangements,
Victor Gilinsky and Paul Langer, The Japanese Civilian Nuclear Program




Statement of French atomic expert M. Bertrand Goldschmidt quoted in Beaton,
Must The Bomb Spread ?, p. 38. Goldschmidt also stated that the minimum
critical mass for a U-235 explosion was twenty kg.
53
For instance, Japan signed 5840 class A (less than one year duration)





which bypassed in-house R&D while importing foreign techniques to save time
in modernization. With little government activity, most of Japan's early
postwar efforts were privately funded. The result was that most money went
toward immediately renumerative projects, such as improvement of existing
products, instead of promoting basic research. Although this pattern still
54
persists, total R&D expenditures have increased dramatically in recent
55
years: From $513 million in 1960 to $3.8 billion in 1971. Tokyo predicts
the same R&D growth rate during this decade, meaning a total outlay of near
$10 billion by 1980. In short, the general trend is to spend money, stress
independent development and check reliance on technology imports.
In the more specific realm of atomic energy, Japan has had an active,
steadily growing program. The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC),
headed by the Director of the Science and Technology Agency, is the principal
government organ for program direction. Its industry counterpart, the Japan
Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) , is fashioned after the traditional zaibatsu;
all companies join together to share the risk of reactor importation, power
station construction and similar undertakings. This arrangement also
facilitates government financing of projects which require large initial
or continuing investments that do not promise immediate monetary returns.
This structure manages an atomic energy program designed to meet Japan's
rapidly expanding electrical power needs. An increasing demand for elec-
tricity and a disproportionate dependence on imported oil means nuclear




Feb. 9, 1972, p. 27. This article quotes a Japanese
electronics official as lamenting that much of Japan's R & D is almost all
"D" with little basic research.
Ibid . The 1971 figure was up 27.5% over 1970 but still well below the
$27.8 billion of U.S. R&D expenditures in 1971.
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security of her energy supplies. Additionally, widespread availability
of cheap atomic, power would greatly improve Japan's bargaining position
concerning the price of foreign oil. For these reasons, the JAEC's Long
Range Program of 1967 forecast a 6,000 megawatt nuclear generating capacity
by 1975 and 30-40,000 mwe by 1985. In the fall of 1970 JAEC revised its
1967 estimates: by 1975 Japan's reactor output would equal 8,600 mwe and
by 1985 total production would reach 60,000 mwe. Shortly thereafter,
Japan's Overall Energy Survey Council announced that the country's elec-
trical power needs in 1985 would be four times her requirements of 1970.
Oil's share of the total energy supply was to remain roughly constant, coal
and water were to drop in importance and nuclear energy was to increase from
58
zero to twenty-six per cent.
The pattern is one of atomic power pushing forward at top speed to
keep pace with spiraling energy demands. Although nuclear energy will
generate only ten per cent of Japan's electricity in 1980, it will have a
large absolute base and will be expanding exponentially. Oil increases will
function primarily to hold the line until 1980, the take-off year for Japan's
rapidly maturing atomic industry. From then to 1985, nuclear power's share
of the energy market will rise by another fifteen percent.
Gilinsky and Langer, Civilian Nuclear Program
,
p. 1. The U.S. AEC pre-
dicted a nuclear electrical generating capacity of 120-170,000 Mwe for the
United States by 1980. By comparison, the Japanese forecast, 10-15% of the
American figures, did not seem excessive since the relative electrical
generating capacities of both countries are roughly in the same ratio.
57
Asahi Shimbun
, February 25, 1972 in Daily , February 26-28, 1972, p. 4 and
Mainichi Shimbun
,
March 4, 1972 in Daily, March 7, 1972.
58
Interim Report (Draft) of Overall Energy Resource Council, Japan, Atomic
Energy Department, May 31, 1971 in Summaries , June, 1971, p. 62 and Emmerson,
Arms, Yen & Power
,
p. 326. See Appendix IV for a complete breakdown of




In short, Japan is undergoing something of a boom in the use of nuclear
power. To cope with this boom, the JAEC plans to obtain its first genera-
tion of reactors from abroad while investing their limited resources in
59
fast breeder technology. This "leap frog" ' strategy could catapult Japan
into the front ranks in nuclear expertise after a decade of heavy dependence
on foreign technology. Reactors installed up to 1980 will be of the U.S.
light water variety. From 1980 to about 1985 Japan will depend on an
interim group of heavy water advanced thermal reactors (ATR) and in the late
1980' s she will complete a switch to fast breeder reactors (FBR) . When
finished, the transition to FBR's will virtually eliminate Tokyo's dependence
on overseas uranium.
Despite its rosy future prospects, atomic power in Japan faces several
current obstacles. First, indigenous uranium resources only total 7700 tons
of low grade ore; Japan circumvents this problem by taking her own capital,
personnel and technology to countries with reserves to prospect and to
f.
-i
operate new mines in cooperation with the host nation. In addition, Tokyo
makes direct purchases of natural ore from uranium-rich countries such a
Canada, France and the United States. Secondly, Japan has no domestic
capacity for uranium enrichment, relying instead on the United States as her
sole supplier. The JAEC is presently functioning under a thirty year agree-
ment, signed originally in 1968 and renegotiated in February, 1972, which
59




Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power
,
p. 330. Japans projected requirements are
100,000 tons of uranium by 1985.
For example, Japan and Canada are now conducting joint prospecting in
British Columbia and Colorado. See Nuclear Engineering International
,
January/February , 1971, p. 12. In addition, Japan has done exploratory
surveys in Indonesia and is engaged in a joint venture with France in Niger.
See Nihon Keizai Shimbun
,
February 19, 1970 in Daily , February 19, 1970, p. 1
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provides 335 tons of enriched uranium to Japanese reactors. In view of
Japan's ever rising energy requirements, this amount of enriched uranium
may prove inadequate. Buying only from the United States also generates
fears of too much reliance on a single source. The result has been in-
creased pressure, external and internal, for alternate enrichment methods
64
plus an increased emphasis on local gas centrifuge/diffusion research.
Japan's Defense Agency head, Yashuhiro Nakasone, created a mild sensation
in Tokyo by proposing a joint Japanese-American enrichment venture, for
peaceful purposes, during his 1970 visit to Washington. More recently,
JAIF has recommended that enrichment be undertaken as a national project
with an accelerated R&D program and a production target of 5,000 tons/year
by 1985.
66
Wall Street Journal , Feb. 28, 1972, p. 24. The original agreement called
for 161 tons of enriched uranium. The 335 tons of enriched uranium to be
furnished under the new contract is more than the total tonnage supplied to all
the thirty other metal buyers who have similar accords with Washington.
See, for example, the statements of Australian Minister of National Develop-
ment Reginal Swartz in Nuclear Engineering
,
August, 1971, p. 616. On an
official visit to Japan, Swartz expressed hope that Japan would aid Australia
in extracting uranium ore and constructing enrichment plants to exploit the
vast uranium reserves of the Northern Territories.
64
Sankei Shimbun
, August 29, 1969 in Daily , August 30-September 2, 1969, p.
12. In August, 1969, the JAEC appropriated 5700 yen for simultaneous develop-
ment of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion techniques to enrich uranium.
Prototypes of each separator were to be completed by 1972 at which time a
final decision to concentrate on one method of enrichment would be made.
New York Times
,
Sept. 11, 1970, p. 4. Nakasone was also reported to have
told Sec. Laird that Japan was considering beginning construction of a
gaseous diffusion plant in 1971. Just why Nakasone, in his Washington visit,
was talking to the American Secretary of Defense about enrichment was not





January/February , 1971, p. 11. JAIF also recommended




Other portions of Japan's fuel cycle, reactors themselves and fuel
fabrication and reprocessing plants, are small but growing steadily. The
JAEC presently has five power reactors with a 1,200 mwe output in operation,
five more producing 3,000 mwe under construction and an additional dozen
fill
major reactors in various design stages. As the result of a joint effort
with General Electric, Toshiba recently fabricated the first nuclear fuel
core in Japan; it is only one of several Japanese companies engaged in
joint fabrication projects with American firms. Japan is also constructing
a fuel reprocessing (i.e. plutonium separation) facility at Tokai Mura which
will be completed in 1974 and will process 210 tons of of irradiated uranium
69
per year.
It is readily apparent that all sectors of Japan's nuclear industry are
booming. From 1954 to 1967 total government expenditures for atomic energy
amounted to $191 million; the fiscal year 1972 budget alone is $170
fit!
For a full breakdown of Japanese power reactors, installed, building or
planned, as of January, 1972, see Appendix V. Japan also possesses 21 re-
search reactors which produce negligible plutonium but serve as valuable




September, 1971, p. 40. Toshiba is now manufacturing the
core for Japan's Fukushima #2 power station. According to General Electric,
this single fabrication plant is the third largest privately-owned operation
of its kind in existence and largest outside the United States. For further
details, see Nuclear Industry , August, 1971, p. 50.
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Nuclear Engineering
, January /February , 1971, p. 12 and Interim
Report
, p. 72. Despite this new capacity, Japan's reproces-
sing demand, (estimated at 530 tons/year by 1980 and 1150 tons/year by 1985),
is expected to render it inadequate by 1977/78. As a result, a second re-
processing facility with an output of "three to five tons per day" is being






million. This absolute investment increase is being maximized in charac-
teristic Japanese fashion; adapting imported foreign techniques to suit
local conditions while training ever larger numbers of indigenous atomic
experts.
This pattern is being simulated, in a belated fashion, by Japan's
space program. Until 1967, Japanese rocketry was a series of ad hoc efforts
dependent exclusively on private funds. Four unsuccessful satellite launches
from 1966 to 1969 prompted strenuous government attempts to coordinate and
stimulate rocket development. In 1968, the entire program was put under the
Space Activities Commission; Tokyo University, leader of prior non-governmental
space endeavors, was given responsibility for basic propulsion research while
governments laboratories concentrated on application of satellites and on
developing the next generation of rocket boosters. After orbiting its first
72
satellite in February, 1970, the Space Activities Commission moved further
away from an independent, private approach to development, calling for imports
73
of foreign technology sufficient to build a medium liquid fuel rocket.
Nuclear Engineering
,
November, 1971, p. 899. The approximate budget break-
down: $84 million for FBR development, $73 million for ATR development, $5
million for the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant, $4.1 million for centrifuge
R&D, $1.6 million for gaseous diffusion R&D and $4.2 million for reactor
safety.
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New York Times , Feb. 11, 1970, p. 9.
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Emmerson, Arms Yen and Power
,
p. 321-322. The Space Activities Commission
report of October 21, 1970, stated:
The need for importing foreign technology was openly
expressed: .. .we must strive to eliminate the techno-
logical gap with foreign countries. For this purpose,
technology introduced by other means should be uti-
lized to push space development efficiency until Japan's
technology reaches a certain level.... it is necessary
for Japan to acquire as soon as possible the technology
related to the medium liquid rocket engine, which could
be further improved to increase its performance,
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Although the opposition parties have viewed this buildup suspiciously, the
lure of scientific prestige has quelled most complaints so long as the pro-
gram has no overt military implications.
Despite its open conduct and proclaimed peaceful nature, Japanese
rocketry today has undeniable military potential. This fact was underscored
by the launch of Japan's second satellite in February, 1971, using a Mu
74
rocket. Developed in cooperation with the United States, this solid fuel
missile has a 4,000 - 5,000 mile range and is roughly equivalent to the early
American Minuteman. It lacks only an inertial guidance system and appropriate
warhead to make it a lethal weapon. Although guidance systems are presently
Japan's weakest area in space technology, her highly sophisticated elec-
tronics industry seems capable of solving most space navigation problems.
A major effort is currently being made to construct a liquid fuel, all-
weather rocket similar to the American Thor variety of Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missiles (IRBM). Scheduled for completion in 1975, this project
in preparation for the launching of large station-
ary satellites in the future.
Japan has already signed (1969) an agreement with the United States to import
certain categories of technology and equipment, including launch-vehicle tech-




p. 317. The Mu is a four-stage solid fuel rocket with a potential
altitude ceiling of 11,200 miles. Used principally for high altitude sound-
ing, it could be equipped with a nuclear warhead and appropriate guidance
mechanism. Its 7000 km range would cover most targets in China and Soviet
Siberia. It was constructed through a joint development contract between
Aerojet General Corp. and Deicel Co. Ltd. of Tokyo.
Kaoru Murakami, "Conditions Surrounding Japan's Nuclearization," Tembo
(April, 1971) in Summaries
,
May, 1971, p. 46. Designing was started in 1971
by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, using technology imported from Douglas Air-
craft Company. In referring to its future implications, Murakami predicts,
"It may be no exaggeration to say that by 1975 there will be an ample pos-
sibility that our country will become capable of developing and manufacturing
nuclear warheads and rockets as a means of delivering them."

38
shows that, after a slow start, Tokyo's space plans are now in high gear.
They aim for the immediate goals of television and communication satellites,
but they likewise offer inherent strategic options.
The technical and strategic limitations to a Japanese nuclear capability
appear fairly easy to overcome. With a mushrooming reactor program, Japan
-j f.
is currently producing enough plutonium, approximately 1200 kg/year, to
support a substantial weapons program. When the Tokai Mura reprocessing
plant is completed in 1974, Tokyo will need only uranium ore resources and
enrichment facilities to be self-sufficient in nuclear development. Meanwhile,
her present arrangements with Canada for ore and with the United States for
enriched uranium are adequate to keep Japan supplied until ATR's and FBR's
take over. While the government explores gas centrifuge/diffusion as means
of domestic uranium enrichment, present circumstances merely seem to increase
such cooperative trends: Japan has ore mining and prospecting contracts with
all the world's uranium-rich nations; she is engaged in joint reactor con-
struction programs with both American and French companies; she has received
from Washington a guaranteed supply of enriched uranium and assured access to
high-level space technology through specific agreements while obtaining
76
Japan's five operational power reactors produce 1200 Mwe/yr and 1 Mwe/yr.
of energy produces 1 kg of Pu-239/yr. Hence, 1200 kg. of Pu-239 are pro-
duced each year.
77
For details on US-Japan uranium enrichment agreement and space technology




general assurances that this policy will continue in the future. Finally,
adaptation of existing rockets and some improvement in guidance mechanisms
could give Japan a reasonably reliable delivery system.
The only remaining conceptual obstacles to a nuclear Japan are cost and
strategic vulnerability. Since Japan's 1975 GNP is conservatively estimated
79
at $400 billion, an allocation of five percent to defense would yield $20
billion. Holding the growth rate of Japan's conventional forces constant
80
at the current 0.8 percent of GNP, would make 4.2 percent or $16.8 billion
available for the research, development and deployment of strategic systems.
Simultaneously, real spending on conventional forces would expand with the
economy at the rate of ten to fifteen percent a year. Five percent of Japan's
GNP would not dislocate her economy and $16.8 million is far in excess of the
United Nation's cost estimate for a "modest" nuclear capacity. Cost, there-
fore, does little to inhibit Japan's weapon potential.
The major theoretical barrier to an atomic Japan is probably the feasi-
bility of any strategic arsenal. First, as a signator of the Limited Test
81
Ban Treaty, Tokyo cannot conduct atmospheric testing and would be hard
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The Japan Times , Jan. 9, 1972, p. 12. The statement issued after President
Nixon's San Clemente meeting with Prime Minister Sato reads, in part, "They
agreed that the two Governments would expand cooperation in the field of
environment, of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the peaceful explora-
tion and use of outer space. They further agreed that experts of the two
countries would examine concrete steps in this regard."
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Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanes e Superstate: Challenge and Response
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 165.
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The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies
1970), p. 72.
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The Test Ban Treaty does, however, have a three month "escape clause"
identical to Article X of the NPT.
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pressed to find suitable underground test sites. Secondly, the very density
of Japan's population and concentration of industrial centers not only raise
the probability of massive damage from nuclear attack but preclude the dis-
persal of weapons necessary for a credible deterrent. Both these diffi-
culties, however, are not insurmountable. Some of the uninhabited Ryukyu
Islands or possible even the northernmost portions of Hokkaido could be used
for testing. Such testing, moreover, would not be an absolute military neces-
sity for crude, first strike weapons. Japan could obviate the vulnerability
problem by deploying all her delivery systems afloat at remote ocean locations
far from the home islands. Despite increased cost, this deployment scheme
would have some distinct strategic advantages since the launch platforms
would become impregnable to attack by ballistic delivery vehicles and war-
heads directed against the missiles would not create domestic civilian
casualties. With the world's most modern and efficient shipbuilding industry,
Japan could likely place long range delivery systems on either surface or
subsurface vessels without great difficulty.
One striking reality, therefore, is that Japan faces no major technical
obstacle to nuclear armament. The principal constraints in 1972, no local ore
supplies and absence of domestic enrichment facilities, are presently by-
passed through various bilateral agreements and are undergoing long-term
erosion as Japan advances toward the FBR. This dependence on foreign sup-
pliers is itself an important constraint on weapon production. Yet Japan's
major ore supplier and sole source of enriched uranium, the United States,
would be unlikely to suspend these shipments, at the risk of permanently




nuclear weapons. Moreover, Japan's gradual movement toward an indlgeneous
enrichment capability promises to eliminate this dependence by 1980 while
. 83
increasing Japanese diplomatic leverage xn the interim.
Tokyo's space and nuclear programs are peaceful in intent but not in
capability. They serve, by improving the level of nuclear technology and
promoting missile development, to raise Japan's latent capacity to acquire
atomic arms. Industrial competition and Japan's quest for international
scientific prestige have made her the leading Nth country in both nuclear
and space know-how and, in many aspects of these technologies, she trails
only the superpowers. In an absolute sense, Japan's policy of keeping her
options open has pushed her nearer to a bomb capability; it has also served
to narrow the relative time lag between a political decision and weapon
acquisition. With completion of the chemical separation plant in 1974,
82
The United States would certainly offer substantial resistance to initial
Japanese moves in this direction. Once Tokyo made a final nuclear decision,
however, Washington would no doubt acquiesce reluctantly rather than launch
Japan on a completely independent international course. This action would
be especially likely if Tokyo's decision were a crash program in response to
some imminent danger with which Washington desired to avoid a direct con-
frontation (such as the People's Republic of China).
go
For references to enrichment and Japan's increased international bargaining
power, see Asahi Shimbun
,
March 31, 1969 in Daily
,
April 3, 1969, p. 44 and
especially Mainichi Shimbun
,
September 16, 1969 in Daily October 8, 1969, p.
32. In this latter article, Yasuhiro Nakasone, soon to become head of the
Japanese Defense Agency, called domestic enrichment "absolutely necessary,"
in global diplomacy. Then Vice Chairman of the LDP Foreign Affairs Research
Council, Nakasone no doubt reflected the sentiments of many of his ruling
party by saying, "Even though we do not have any special intention of having
atomic bombs, to have other nations know that we have 'that' (i.e. domestic
enrichment facilities), we are in a setup where we can divert it to other use





Japan will possibly be able to bridge this gap in a single year.
Given this technical ability for weapon manufacture, disincentives for
a national nuclear armament program must be founded on grounds other than
prohibitive cost, lack of capacity or poor prospects for effectiveness of
strategic systems once developed. The serious impediments to a nuclear
Japan must be political and will thus depend on her government's perception
of security threats in Asia and on her own internal affairs.
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This prediction is based on a general estimate in Leonard Beaton and John
Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto and Windus for the
Institute for Strategic Studies 1962), p. 26. With a reactor already pro-
ducing plutonium and separation facilities available, nuclear weapons could
likely be manufactured in less than a year. The only constraints in that
situation would be the design and construction of the warhead and associated
triggering mechanism. Even without a reprocessing plant (Japan's current
situation), Beaton and Maddox state that atomic arms can be produced within
two years. For a combined political-technical viewpoint, see Major H. E.
McCracken, "Japan's View of Korea," United States Naval Institu te Proceedings
,
Vol. 98 (February, 1972), 47. On the basis of his personal observations while
being stationed in Japan, McCracken states that, given her technological
foundation, "it is acknowledged that Japan could (presently) produce a
arsenal of nuclear weapons with a delivery system within one year after the
political decision is made." Parentheses added.

CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY
The most notable characteristic of Japan's postwar defense policy has
been the tremendous influence of the United States. Immediate postwar cir-
cumstances made this relationship almost inevitable. From 1945 to 1952,
Japan was under the American Occupation and in 1950 war erupted in neighbor-
ing South Korea. These events convinced Prime Minister Yoshida to cast
Japan's lot in the Cold War with the United States, resulting in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty and the associated American-Japanese Security Treaty
in 1951. Thus aligned, Japan proceeded to reestablish her international
status as a law-abiding and self-respecting state. Reparations payments in
1952, United Nations admission in 1956 and normalization of relations with
Moscow in 1956 were all examples of Japanese efforts to regain world crede-
bility.
The 1951 Security Treaty itself was a product of bipolar alignments
during the Cold War. It was typical of a period in which national interests
of individual states in each camp were characteristically subordinated to
the collective interests of their respective camps. Japan's national
interests were equated with those of the Free World in general and the United
States in particular. The threat to her security was viewed as identical to
that facing other friends of the Free World—international communism led by
the Soviet Union. Traditional Japanese security considerations resulting
from her role in East Asia and individual relations with other states in that
region were submerged in the welter of American-Soviet confrontation. Most
importantly, the Russian threat arose not from direct Japanese-Soviet inter-
action but instead from the all-inclusive nature of bipolar power politics.
This perception led Japan, and most other states as well, to ignore the
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Chinese threat as separate and distinct until the early 1960's.
The Security Treaty and similar diplomatic moves were also coupled with
internal efforts to strengthen Japan's security. At the insistence of
General MacArthur, head of the Occupation, Tokyo established a National
Police Reserve in 1950 to replace United States troops sent to Korea. In
1952 Yoshida expanded this organization into the National Safety Agency and
8 S
two years later renamed it the Self Defense Force (SDF). The SDF was
divided into Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces (GSDF, MSDF and
ASDF respectively) and numbered slightly over 100,000 men in 1954. Although
this build-up was undertaken on a relatively modest scale, it represented an
abrupt reversal of Occupation efforts to demilitarize Japan. Indeed, the
very existence of the SDF violated Article 9 of Japan's new constitution
which expressly prohibited the nation's maintenance of any war potential.
Consequently, the legal foundation of Japan's entire military system remained
very poorly defined. The process of rearming consisted of a cumulative series
of faits accomplis rather than a well-planned program enjoying widespread
public support.
In 1960, Washington and Tokyo concluded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security which forms the core of current security relations between the
two nations. This agreement had significant changes from the 1951 Security
Pi ft
Treaty but was still based on a mutually perceived need to contain the
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Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-68 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 108.
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Okinawa, Hearings testimony of U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1189. The 1960 Treaty
changes were: The Treaty was given a ten year life span subject to automatic
extension thereafter (or termination on one year's notice by either party);
any references to American intervention in Japan's internal affairs were de-
leted; the United States formally committed herself to defend Japan against
external threats; the practice of prior consultation between Tokyo and
Washington on major changes in American force deployments in Japan was offici-
ally sanctioned. A later exchange of diplomatic notes certified that con-
sultation in essence meant Japanese approval.
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communist monolith. As such, the Treaty's rationale began to disappear be-
fore its ink was dry. The Sino-Soviet split of 1960, the Chinese atomic
explosion of 1964 and the decade-long Vietnam War propelled nations from a
bipolar into a multipolar world with attendant economic, strategic and
political implications. Yet the 1960 Treaty preserved the bipolar balance,
enabling Japan to exert herself politically and diplomatically with little
autonomous defense capability. Tokyo thereby achieved considerable success
in world politics without paying the costs of defense that usually result
from increased interaction in the international system.
From a strictly economic standpoint, the 1960 Security Treaty proved
a great boon to Japan. She received generous quantities of American military
aid and attained a favorable position from which to increase her share of the
vast United States' consumer market. Japan achieved a solid defense position
without massive rearmament or overseas commitments and consequently maximized
the benefits from her American alliance while effectively minimizing the risks
,
Indirectly, the Treaty fostered a kind of economic myopia which has
characterized all aspects of Japan's foreign policy since 1960. Reluctant to
assume external military commitments, Tokyo has not hesitated to expand her
influence via economic means. In 1963, she became a full member of the
United Nations Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
,
officially entering the world trade sphere. She later joined the Development
and Assistance Committee (DAC) of the United Nations, accepting its assistance
87
goal: Foreign aid expenditure equal to one percent of national income.
In 1966, Japan hosted several conferences on international development and
87




helped found the Asian Development Bank with a contribution of $200 million,
an amount matched only by the United States. During the same year Japan
established the Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, a rough equivalent of the
American Peace Corps, which has been used almost exclusively in Asia.
Tokyo is presently committed to nine of the fifteen functioning regional
cooperative organizations in the Far East, showing continued enthusiasm for
88
such groups so long as they have no overt political overtones. This
strategy appears safe since the bodies presently abjure territorial and
security issues in favor of broader economic and cultural questions where more
agreement exists. If these groups survive the tensions of local power poli-
tics, however, they may become important transitional devices in the process
of regularizing responsible participation in the international system. By
providing an element of cohesion and sense of collective strength, they may
eventually make alignments with extra-regional powers acceptable to weaker
states, deepening member commitment to an active political, and ultimately
military, role in Asia.
These few examples illustrate a subtle, perhaps naive, aspect of Japan's
defense philosophy: the belief that she can maintain security through economic
power only when her neighbors are secure and prosperous. This automatic
tendency to equate prosperity with peace provides the political rationale for
an aid program which gives the Japanese several advantages. Because they
Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan and South East Asia in the 1970' s," Current History
,
Vol. 60 (April, 1971), 205. The major organizations are: Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) , Asian Productivity Organization
(AP0) and the Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development in South and
Southeast Asia. Japan's desire to avoid the political implications of these




omit military requirements, aid programs are attractive both at home and
abroad. Their Asian-to-Asian nature appeals to countries afraid of losing
their cultural identity to the West while Japan's proximity to these nations
minimizes transportation costs. Most importantly, these initiatives foster
the type of economic cooperation vital to Japan's success as a world trader.
With rising labor costs at home, Japanese industrialists find such countries
ideal for importation of their labor-intensive industries.
Despite these positive aspects, Japan's aid programs have encountered
numerous obstacles. First, responsibility for aid administration is split
among four government agencies. The resulting inter-agency competition over
individual projects inhibits effective coordination of aid objectives. Second,
89
Japan's terms for assistance are stricter than those offered by other nations.
Finally, Japan's low level of technical cooperative aid and the large amount
90
of her total aid supplied by private industry mean most assistance has a
distinct profit motive. Even the bulk of Japan's "government" aid is subsi-
dized export expansion designed to assist Japanese business and not the
recipient. Not surprisingly, such conditions are often termed "exploitive"
by the receiving country.
The long range goal of Japanese aid is to improve political stability in
Asia while its short run byproducts are profit and prestige. For Westernized
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Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia
,
p. 148. Throughout the 1960's eighty percent
of all DAC countries offered loans at three percent interest with twenty-five
years to repay. Japan's best terms were 3.5 percent repayable after twenty
years.
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Wakaizumi, "Japan and South East Asia," pp. 202-203. In 1969, the ratio
of Japan's technical cooperative aid to total aid was 1.5 percent, lowest of
all the DAC nations. In the same year, the ratio of government aid to total
assistance was 34.5 percent for Japan while the DAC average was 49.7 percent.
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Japan, such joint ventures are the most powerful common cause shared with
her Asian counterparts. But aid programs are merely the tip of a Japanese
economic iceberg which pervades the Far East and extends throughout the
world.
Given her insular position and lack of certain natural resources,
Japan's economic expansion relies heavily on the vicissitudes of inter-
national trade. Her present prosperity rests squarely on a cycle of import-
process-export necessitating a continuous influx of raw materials transported
91
across thousands of miles of open ocean. Not only does Japan get over
ninety percent of her oil from the Persian Gulf, but she also imports eighty
92
percent of all her raw materials and twenty percent of her food. To fuel
91
In one sense, Japan's limited territory and meager natural resource supply
have speeded her economic expansion. Since sea transportation costs are
about one tenth of land rates, Tokyo can utilize economies of scale and
ship more bulk over longer distances for less money. Lack of indigenous
raw materials enables wholesale importation of required goods without re-
gard for protecting local industry, while limited territorial size decrease
expensive port-to-factory transport costs.
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These figures are derived from complementary data in four different
sources: Robert Epp, "The U. S.-Japanese Treaty Crisis," Current History
,
Vol. 58 (April, 1970), 207; Donald Hellmann, "The Confrontation with





. by James W. Morley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1972), p. 161, Strategic Survey 1969 (London: Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 81; Hideo Sekino, "U. S. -Japan Military
Relations at a Turning Point," Kikusai Mondai
,
November, 1971 in Summaries
,
March, 1972, p. 52. This last source cites the following percentage of key
materials that Japan must import: 99.4% crude oil, 98.5% iron ore, 100%
bauxite, 89.9% copper ore, 100% nickel, 80.1% wheat, 100% wool, 100% raw
cotton and 100% natural rubber. Japan is also the world leader in total
import tonnage, 300 million tons, and tonnage of merchant ships owned, 30
million tons. Although total imports comprise a relatively modest (7-9%)




this pipeline Japan boasts the world's largest merchant marine, but to pro-
tect it she has only the MSDF. Since this organization is designed solely
for coastal defense, Japan actually depends on the United States' Seventh
Fleet to preserve her status as a world trading giant by assuring her access
to resources and markets in Asia and the world. One possible hitch in this
cozy relationship is that Article 5 of the Security Treaty specifically says
the United States is not obliged to protect Japanese merchantmen on the high
93
seas. In an era of uncertain American credibility, one lesson of Japan's
tremendous economic expansion during the 1960 's is increasingly clear: her
economic survival depends on free entry to oceans she does not control and
on peace and stability in regions where she has little effective influence.
To appreciate the future implications of this lesson, however, the past
pattern of Japan's postwar relations with Asia must be examined. This
scrutiny, in turn, is probably best achieved by first viewing four areas of
considerable importance to Japan's security: South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast
Asia and the U.S.S.R.
The Korean peninsula has always been of concern to 20th century Japan.
It was Japanese territory from 1910 until 1945, and it assumed renewed
significance with the outbreak of hostilities in 1950. World War II
animosities and colonial hatred between both nations continued relatively un-
abated until the fall of Syngman Rhee ten years later. This leadership change
93
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,
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in South Korea facilitated a gradual easing of tensions, a trend highlighted
94
by the Japanese-Korean Peace Treaty of 1965.
In pure strategic terms, South Korea provides Japan with defense in
depth on her western flank by serving as an advance position for friendly
ground forces and lending additional width against any air attack from the
continent. Invasion of South Korea by a continental power would directly
threaten southern Japan. Geographic proximity would drastically reduce such
an occupant's seaborne transportation requirements for a future amphibious
95
assault on Japan. In addition, the possessor could easily establish air
supremacy over the Straits of Tsushima, thereby restricting MSDF operations
and facilitating the reinforcement of his original attack force while main-
taining secure logistic lines. Although such a possibility is strictly
hypothetical, the strategic importance Japan attaches to South Korea was
revealed by disclosure of the "Three Arrows Plan" in 1965. Essentially a
military contingency plan, it called for emergency mobilization of the SDF
96in the event of a communist invastion of South Korea. Regardless of their
validity, these threat perceptions are a political reality for a majority of
Japanese. The LDP especially thinks that South Korea in the hands of an
unfriendly power seriously jeopardizes Japan's security.
94
Under terms of the 1965 Treaty, Japan settled past Korean property claims
in the form of $300 million in outright grants, $200 million in government
loans and $300 million in private commercial credits. In exchange, South
Korea abolished the infamous Rhee Line, curtailing her seizure of Japanese
fishing vessels between 50 miles (Rhee Line) and 12 miles (new territorial
limit) of her coast.
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, January 29 - February 5, 1968, p. 14. Kosaka estimates
that it would ordinarily require over one million tons of shipping for a
continental power to invade Japan. An invasion of South Korea, however,
would reduce the figure for a direct assault on Japan to 100,000 tons.
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McCracken, "Japan's View of Korea," p. 45. The plan assumed a North Korean
land and air assault on South Korea assisted by Chinese air power.
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Aside from these military considerations, South Korea is of sub-
stantial commercial importance to Japan. It furnishes a ready market for
Japanese goods and provides a source of cheap labor to support Japanese
investment. As mentioned previously, this last condition is especially
important too in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Few new additions to Japan's
97
work force coupled with rising wages have forced Japan to invest large
quantities of money in these regions, utilizing their inexpensive labor pool
98
to expand Japan's own industrial capacity. A pair of additional factors
will also encourage future Japanese multinational operations in East Asia.
First, rising land costs and more stringent environmental restrictions at
99
home will force firms to locate abroad to reduce physical plant expenses.
Second, foreign investment remains one essential means to secure key raw
materials at reasonable prices for Japan's growing industries. It is,
therefore, vital to Japan's security and prosperity that these areas and
access to them remain free from serious political restrictions or tensions.
An always unpredictable and frequently aggressive North Korea, as evidenced
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Economic Clouds Gather on Japans Horizon," New York
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,
Dec. 19, 1971, III, p. 14. In 1970-71 Japan's Labor Ministry esti-
mated the current shortage of skilled labor at 1,820,000 persons. Whereas
1,240,000 eighteen year olds entered the labor market in 1966, it is esti-
mated that only 770,000 will do so in 1974. This phenomena is likely to
push wages higher, accelerate inflation and create labor unrest, all in-
centives for companies to expand abroad.
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Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate
,
p. 96. Kahn estimates Japan can
add possibly 100 million people to her blue collar work force in this manner,
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"Japan's Moment of Truth," Far Eastern Economic Review
,
March 4, 1972, p.
47. This lack of suitable domestic location is especially critical since
Japan's total space requirement for industry is expected to reach 300,000
hectares in 1985, triple that of 1965.
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by the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents, threatens the viability of this invest-
ment in South Korea as well as the security of Japan's western coast.
Japan's relations with Taiwan spring from a colonial legacy similar to
that of Korea; the island was occupied by Japan from 1895 to 1945. After a
brief postwar separation, Japan was linked with Formosa in a somewhat dif-
ferent fashion. Largely as a quid pro quo for the American Senate's rati-
fication of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan signed a separate peace
treaty with Taiwan in 1952. This agreement has fostered a steady growth
of trade and investment between Tokyo and Taipei and has reinforced existing
historical-psychological bonds between the two nations. Formosa's importance
was further increased by the discovery of oil on the Senkaku Islands, just
north of Taiwan, in 1968. Although Tokyo's subsequent claim to the islands
is disputed by Taipei, the Senkaku' s strategic value as an alternative oil
source for Japan could add a new dimension to Japan-Taiwan relations.
Finally, Formosa's position astride Japan's southern sea lanes makes friendly
contact vital to continued freedom of the seas for Tokyo.
For an excellent description of the American role in the 1952 Japan-
Republic of China Treaty see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New
York: Signet Books 1969), pp. 770-774.
ECAFE reports in 1968 and 1969 suggested that the entire East China
Sea might be a rich alternative source of oil. Under the 1958 Geneva
Agreement, all coastal states including China had rights in the area, which
must in practice be defined by mutual agreement. Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan finessed this point by dividing the area among themselves and
ignoring the PRC. Peking subsequently claimed mineral rights to the area
in December, 1970, adding its deposition to already conflicting claims be-
tween Tokyo and Taipei. On Japan's claim to the islands, see the Foreign




This same combination of commercial and strategic interests repeats
102
itself in Japan's relations with Southeast Asia. During last fifteen
years, Japan's trade with this region has more than doubled, amounting to
103
20.7 percent of all her international exchange in 1970. The extent of
Japanese economic penetration is further evidenced by the bilateral trade
patterns between Tokyo and Southeast Asia; Japan is currently the first or
104
second trading partner of every nation in the region. Although the
asymmetry of relations with individual nations provides Japan with some
political leverage, many countries possess raw materials and agricultural
products of great importance to the Japanese; Indonesian oil and Malaysian
rubber are two examples. Trade ties are supplemented by Japanese investments
throughout the Far East. Japan's Industrial Structure Council recently
estimated that overall foreign investment, much of it in Asia, would total
$11.5 billion by 1975, a fourfold increase from 1970. These purely
102
For purpose of this paper, Southeast Asia includes Burma, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, North Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and South Vietnam.
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Japan Economic Yearbook 1971 (Tokyo: The Oriental Economist 1971), p. 69.
The breakdown of two way trade for 1970 showed 25.4 percent of Japan's ex-
ports went to Southeast Asia while 16.0 percent of her total imports came
from that region.
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Hiroshi Kitamura, "Japan's Economic Policy Toward Southeast Asia," Asian
Affairs
,
Vol. 59 (February, 1972), 54-55. The Industrial Structure Council
is an advisory body to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI). Although few official figures are available, Kitamura estimates
Japan's Asian investment to 1969 as follows: Indonesia $200 million, Taiwan
$63 million, Thailand $78 million, Malaysia $40 million, South Korea $14
million, Philippines $46 million, Hong Kong $12 million and Singapore $24
million. In light of other data, his estimates for both Taiwan and South
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economic concerns are also associated with persistent Japanese military
worries about the Straits of Malacca through which the bulk of Japan's crude
oil imports pass.
Overshadowing this expanding web of political and economic intercon-
nections is the Vietnam War. Just as the Korean War was the catalyst for
recovery in Japan after World War II, the Vietnam conflict has hastened her
growth in the 1960 's. Here Japan has played both sides of the fence and thus
far has been quite successful. She has flooded South Vietnam with hondas,
television sets and agricultural machinery while simultaneously becoming
North Vietnam's leading trade partner. Although she shuns any situation
that suggests even indirect military support for Saigon and keeps her political
commitments to the Theiu regime purposefully ambiguous, Japan finds a ready
J
r\£L
market for her goods in an economy sustained by American aid. Confident
of a substantial United States presence, Japan has continued to expand her
economic influence in Vietnam and elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia. Now
that American troop withdrawals make the area's security less certain,
Japanese trade and investment are potentially exposed in ways that might
make even inaction a painful decision. Tokyo's concern over Washington's
See, for example, Wall Street Journal , Jan. 19, 1972, p. 30. In this
article Pham Kim Ngoe, South Vietnam's minister of the economy, is quoted
as saying, "Vietnam is looking to Japan as the major help in building up
industry now and after the war. I urge the Japanese to do it now while the
Americans are still bankrolling us. Thus, the Japanese can reap the bene-




May 31, 1971, p. 5. In addition to Vietnam pullouts,
Sec. of State Rogers has announced plans for withdrawal of 16,000 troops




policy combined with increasing regional pressures for a more politically
active Japan are troublesome variables in the Japanese security equation.
In the absence of the United States, it is quite possible that Japan's
economic partners in Southeast Asia will seek stability through new regional
security arrangements which would demand Japanese participation via political
and ultimately military channels. Such pressures were clearly evidenced at
the May, 1970, Djakarta conference on Cambodia. It marked the first time
Japan had participated in an international political conference since World
109
War II and illustrated her inability to avoid a leading non-economic role
in Asia.
In contrast to her rapid penetration of Southeast Asia, Tokyo's postwar
relations with the U.S.S.R. have been characterized by slow, tortuous progress.
While Cold War alignments offer a partial explanation, Japan's claim to the
Southern Kurile Islands and a general public dislike for the Soviets are
probably more important. Pushed by Tokyo with increasing vehemence since
1955, the Kuriles issue has now acquired a political inertia of its own with-
in Japan. Public enmity for Moscow stems from a variety of historical factors
1 08
See Okinawa: Hearings , testimony of U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1195. Perhaps
both the depth and naivete of this anxiety were indicated by an incident which
occurred during Sec. Johnson's tenure as ambassador to Tokyo. Several promi-
nent Japanese contacted the American Embassy shortly after President Johnson's
announced bombing halt on March 31, 1968, believing this action to be a pre-
text for an immediate United States withdrawal from Vietnam. The jist of
their comments was, "The things we said (in Japan about U.S. involvement)
were for local political consumption and not what we really meant."
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of which the island dispute is simply the most recent example. Most frequently
mentioned is the belated Russian entry into the Pacific War, a direct viola-
tion of their non-aggression pact with Japan. The result is that the U.S.S.R.
usually occupies top position in any "most disliked nation" poll. Even after
formal normalization of relations in 1956, Japanese-Soviet contacts showed
little advance.
This situation was quickly altered, however, by the Sino-Soviet split in
1960. Russia's strategic posture shifted from its immediate postwar goal of
containing Japan to a policy of encircling China, entangling the United States,
and preserving Soviet freedom of action. The consequence was a marked growth
in economic interchange between Tokyo and the Kremlin with trade increasing
to $821 million in 1970 and both nations negotiating over numerous Siberian
development contracts. Most attractive of the Siberian projects is a proposed
pipeline to carry cheap, low sulfur crude oil from central Siberia to the
coastal city of Nakhodka. Yet the mere fact that this program has been
under intensive negotiation since 1968 illustrates the difficulties involved.
Moscow prefers Siberian oil, timber and natural gas as economic enticements
to lessen American influence and to attract Japanese capital to Russia's Far
Eastern frontier; Japan weighs her need for these raw materials against a
long-standing distrust of Soviet motives and a desire to avoid excessive
dependence on Soviet resources. The outcome of such ambivalent feelings is
unclear, but they will definitely continue to affect the external milieu con-
fronting Japan in the 1970' s.
Japan Economic Yearbook 1971, p. 69.
Michael Malloy, "Will Japan Lose Siberia to Nixon?", Far Eastern Economic
Review
,
December 4, 1971, p. 35. The proposed pipeline would yield fifty
million tons of oil annually to energy hungry Japan.
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Despite these external changes, the posture of Japan's SDF has remained
constant, undergoing little absolute growth since completing its first Defense
Buildup Plan in 1960. Japan has instead preferred better mobility to in-
creased size, pursuing this goal through modernization of equipment and eleva-
tion of technical standards in defense-related industries. The 190,000 man
GSDF has thus maintained virtually the same manpower level for the last
112
decade while the MSDF and ASDF have shown slight size increases but have
also concentrated on re-equipment.
These rather modest increases have been the product of both local and
international forces. Domestically, this low fiscal priority for defense
coincides with a strong pacifist sentiment in Japan but is really produced by
institutional changes emanating from the Occupation. First, the SDF is
administered by the Defense Agency under a civilian Director General, who,
in turn, is responsible to the Prime Minister. The highest uniformed officer
is two grades below the cabinet. Second, the Defense Agency's civilian
113
hierarchy is a "mixed family," composed mostly of bureaucrats on temporary
112Hiroshi Shinohara, "National Defense," Japan Quarterly , XVIII (April-June,
1971), 157. Present approximate force levels are as follows: GSDF - 190,000 men
(reserves included); MSDF - 36,000 men, 39 destroyers, 10 submarines, 157
smaller combatants; ASDF - 40,000 men, 102 Nike missiles, 192 F-104E jets,
287 F-86F jets, 446 other combat aircraft.
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, March 11, 1972 in Daily , March 17, 1972, p. 22; Yomuri
Shimbun
,
March 12, 1972 in Daily , March 16, 1972, p. 21. These articles
focus on the lack of civilian control in the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA)
as supposedly illustrated by the transportation of SDF equipment to Okinawa
prior to formal approval by the National Defense Council. Assailed as a
"wild run of the uniformed," this purported transgression points out the more
fundamental problem—internal confusion within the JDA. The picture is that
of a Defense Agency whose constituent bureaus are controlled by personnel
from other branches of government: The Defense Bureau is staffed by MITI
personnel; the Accounting Bureau relies on Finance Ministry assistance; the
Personnel and Education Bureau is dominated by the Autonomous Agency and
National Personnel Agency. In Mainichi'
s
words, "There remains such a doubt-
Is it really possible for 'mixed family members' to formulate such 'a reason-
able thing' as a defense policy?"

58
assignment from other ministries. Primarily concerned about returning to
their parent organizations, these officials show little enthusiasm for imple-
menting, much less formulating, effective strategic policy. Third, Defense
Agency monetary requests are reviewed by the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) and the Finance Ministry before they are even included
in the government's proposed budget. Submerged within a disorganized and
institutionally subordinate agency, the armed forces have little direct
access to the policy process. The Diet exercises an additional measure of
control through approval of Defense budgets, manpower levels and mobilization
requests.
In a more general sense, Japan's entire postwar atmosphere has inhibited
the policy latitude of her military planners. Here public opposition to any
form of rearmament and the high priority assigned to Japan's economic growth
have set definite limits on defense spending. For example, a wartorn and
economically insecure Japan of 1954 devoted 1.72 percent of her GNP to defense
while Japan the economic giant of 1968 spent only 0.88 percent for military
114
purposes.
Despite these built in restrictions, the Japanese defense establishment
has slowly but inexorably increased its strength. Technically, it ranks with
the world's best and, with its strong material foundation, can expand
rapidly. The government achieved this capabilicy without arousing the public
primarily because it kept defense spending near one. percent of Japan's GNP.
While this approach mollified defense critics, the SDF expanded with Japan's
booming economy. The result has been a doubling of absolute military ex-
penditures every six years since 1952.
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Martin E. Weinstein, "Defense Policy and the Self Defense Forces," The
Japan Interpreter
,
VI (Summer, 1970), 175.
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Much of the impetus for this gradual build-up has come from Japan's
influential industrial sector. Besides a general concern with the security
of their overseas investments, these companies are interested in spinoff
benefits of military R&D and desire self-sufficiency in arms production.
This drive for a domestic arms capability is probably the major defense-
related motivation for Japanese industry. Led by the powerful Mitsubishi
combine, Japan's contractors are striving to limit foreign competition
and to encourage greater technological competence among native industries.
Although arms production is currently less than 0.5 percent of industrial
output, this strategy is designed to utilize existing economic strength to
build a solid base for future expansion. While both are small in size, the
lift
industrial segment of Tokyo's "industrial-military complex" far out-
weighs the military one in potential influence. A good example of its grow-
ing voice are the figures for Japan's Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-
1976): over ninety percent of its weapons and equipment will be procured
at home. With its close ties to the ruling Liberal Democrats, the
"Reality of Defense Industry in its 20th Year," Toyo Keizai
,
September
19, 1970 in Summaries , November, 1970, p. 22. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
is easily Japan's leading defense producer, receiving over thirty percent
of all domestic contracts. With the exception of the BADGE detection system,
Mitsubishi has manufactured all major weapons items not imported from the
United States. For a complete breakdown of all Japanese defense industries,
see Appendix VII.
lift
Hanson W. Baldwin, "Japan Slowly Revives Arms Industry," New York Times
,
Dec. 12, 1970, p. 10. According to Baldwin, "The Industrial-Military com-
plex does not run modern Japan, but it is part of the Establishment, and the
industrial part of it—highly influential in both economies and politics
—
is demonstrating an increasing interest in, and capability for, the manu-
facture of armaments."
" Asahi Shimbun , April 28, 1971 in Daily, April 29-30, 1971, p. 5.

60
business community seems capable of becoming the catalyst, though not the
driving force, in a possible Japanese rearmament.
To date, however, Japan has continued her low defense profile thanks
to the American alliance. Japan's defense posture throughout the 1960 's
remained essentially what it was in 1954: To defend the home islands
against direct and indirect aggression. With the United States policing the
rest of Asia, Tokyo's only concern was securing its own shores from internal
118
subversion or direct invasion. The SDF was capable of countering only
intermediate-level external threats, thereby raising the threshold of attack
for a potential aggressor. Because of SDF strength, any Soviet or Chinese
thrust against Japan would be on a scale large enough to activate the Security
Treaty and provoke an American response. In this manner, the SDF would
sustain Washington's guarantee of protection, magnifying the credibility of
its deterrent and minimizing the dangers of outside attack.
These same strategic assumptions underlie the Fourth Defense Buildup
Plan and the 1970 Defense Agency White Paper, Japan's most recent security
planning documents. The Fourth Plan aims to create a "system capable of
effectively dealing with all armed aggression involving localized or minor
119
warfare and the use of conventional weapons." Although "localized" is
not defined, the Plan provides for material improvements consistent with the
118
Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy
,
p. 112. A good illustration of these
strategic assumptions was the National Defense Council staff paper of 1966.
Major threats (in order of decreasing priority) and methods of combating
them were perceived to be: U.S.S.R. and PRC nuclear weapons—counter by
reliance on U.S. nuclear umbrella; large scale conventional attacks on the
home islands—counter by cooperation with the U.S. in accordance with the
Security Treaty; massive internal disorders— suppress by use of the GSDF.
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present SDF mission of conventional home island defense, an objective
further supported by the Plan's stated goals: To improve the image of the
SDF, to integrate various defense functions and to work for the autonomous
120
development of military equipment. Manpower levels will increase slightly
while new destroyers and F-4 Phantom jets will comprise the major weapons
121
additions in the $16 million package. The only significant change over
prior plans will be 100,000 tons of new construction for the MSDF, upgrading
its anti-submarine warfare capability and giving Tokyo a navy capable of
controlling the Sea of Japan and its straits. Even this alteration, however,
is geared more to early intercept of a potential invader than to any specific
notion to protect Japan's far-flung merchant fleet.
In contrast to the routine nature of the Fourth Plan, Japan's Defense




"Japanese Defense Policy, Survival , XIII (January, 1971), 3.
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Data derived from complementary figures in three different sources. See
"Reality of Defense Industry" in Summaries
,
p. 16; New York Times , Apr. 28
1971, p. 7; Strategic Survey 1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies
1971), p. 35. The $16 million total of the Fourth Plan will comprise an
average annual expenditure equal to one percent of Japan's GNP. This amount
represents a considerable absolute increase over the $6.6 million, consti-
tuting 0.8 percent of annual GNP, during the Third Plan (1967-1971).
Upon completion of the Fourth Plan, Japan will have the world's seventh
largest military force with overall force/equipment levels significantly
increased: GSDF strength will use from 260,000 to 271,000 men; the MSDF
will have about 200 ships totalling 247,000 tons; the ASDF will possess some
900 aircraft, including 158 F-4 interceptors. Specific equipment additions,
by category, are: AIRCRAFT - 104 F-4's, 40-50 XT- 2 supersonic trainers,
40 XC-1_ medium transports, 30-40 PS-1_ antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft,
300-400 GSDF helicopters, 20 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft; NAVAL
CRAFT—two 8000 ton helicopter convoy ships (DLH's), 10 submarines;
MISSILES— Sparrow III air-to-air missiles (AAM's), two varieties of short
range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's) with 50-100 km and 20-50 km ranges.
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Defense Policy" of 1957. The process was formally initiated in March, 1970,
when Defense Agency Chief Nakasone published the "Five Principles of
122
Autonomous Defense." Commonly referred to as jishu boei (autonomous
defense), these precepts promised Japan would: (1) maintain the Consti-
tution and defend her national territory; (2) maintain harmony between
defense and diplomacy and keep a balance among national policies; (3) main-
tain civilian control of the military; (4) maintain the Government's three
non-nuclear principles of not manufacturing, not possessing and not import-
ing nuclear weapons: (5) supplement Japan's resources for national defense
within the American-Japanese security system. The first three principles
merely reaffirmed existing commitments to the Constitution, statesmanship
and civilian control of the armed forces. Nakasone 's fourth axiom, the
"three nuclear no's" had been stated many times before by Prime Minister
Sato but in a somewhat different context. Sato's declarations were always
more in the spirit of an administration policy statement rather than a
legally binding doctrine. Even though it only reiterated Sato's pledges,
Nakasone 's fourth principle was the first time an official government
document had directly addresssed the nuclear question. By simply broaching
this divisive issue, the fourth maxim represented an important departure
from Japan's past.
The fifth and most controversial principle was an attempt to boost
Japan's defense capability within the boundaries of the American
alliance. It was part of a general effort by Prime Minister Sato to minimize
the expected crisis over revision of the Security Treaty in June, 1970.
122
For an analysis, see Kobun Ito, "Japan's Security in the 1970's," Asian
Survey X (December, 1970), 1031-1036.
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First announced the previous fall, this policy called for greater Japanese
123
defense efforts to be supplemented by cooperation with the United States.
More a change in emphasis than one in substance, this policy sought to down-
play the Security Treaty's significance by portraying it as subordinate to
Japan's own capability. As part of a government policy orchestration seeking
short-term political benefits, Nakasone's fifth principle did little to
clarify future directions in defense policy. It implied greater expenditures
124
than those under the Fourth Plan but was never further defined by the
government.
Nowhere is this pattern of ambiguity more apparent than in the White
125
Paper of October, 1970. The document emphasizes continued reliance on
the United States nuclear umbrella and advocates gradual conventional force
increases to handle various threats to the home islands. It is explicit,




October 15, 1969 in Daily , October 18-20, 1969, p.





Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Defense in the 1970's: The Public View,"
Asian Survey X (December, 1970), 1047. Nakasone fueled this speculation by
telling the Tokyo Foreign Correspondent's Club in March, 1970, that the 1972-
1976 defense budget would need to be twice its present level to achieve the
goal of "autonomous defense." This statement implied annual defense ex-
penditures from 1.6 to 2.0 percent of Japan's GNP instead of the 1.0 percent
envisioned under the Fourth Plan.
125
For partial text of the White Paper (preliminary draft) see Asahi Shimbu
,
September 17, 1969 in Daily , September 20-22, 23, 24, 25 & 26, 1969.
1 9f\
"Japanese Defense Policy," 4. According to the Paper, "Japan's defense
capabilities, which are purely for her own defense, will only be utilized in
case of aggression against Japan to defend the nation's peace and independence
in exercise of the nation's inherent right of self-defense and will remain
strategically on the defensive."
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Possession of nuclear arms, missiles or long range bombers are ruled out as
contrary to Japan's "peace" constitution while "small size nuclear
127
weapons" ' are deemed legal under certain circumstances. To complete this
confusing picture, Nakasone introduced the Paper with references to Japan's
future status as a "middle class non-nuclear nation," a statement sub-
sequently repudiated by Sato.
A more detailed analysis finds the White Paper divided into four basic
categories which: (1) describe why Japan needs a security structure: (2)
assess the Soviet and Chinese military capabilities; (3) explain why
neutrality/nonalignment is not a viable foreign policy, and; (4) outline the
SDF buildup under the Third and Fourth Plans. The Paper is primarily a
description of present force levels and a justification of existing government
policy. Nowhere does it discuss the potential threats posed to Japan nor
does it attempt to estimate Japan's capacity to counter these challenges.
It is, in essence, no more than a bland effort to raise the public's rudi-
129




Oct. 20, 1970, p. 17. Particularly interesting is the
Cabinet's reported phraseology change from the Defense Agency draft. The
original Paper read that while constitutionally Japan could possess small
nuclear weapons, the Government "at present" was against this move. The
revised version states "It is possible to possess small nuclear weapons
if their power is no more than necessary and the minimum for defense. But








October 24, 1970, p. 12. A Times editorial shortly after
the White Paper's official release indicates the nature of Japan's domestic
defense quandry:
We welcome that fact that the White Paper was prepared and
published. It is indeed strange that this should be the
first time that a report of this nature should be made
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These statements— the Fourth Plan, jishu boei and the Defense White
Paper—represent tentative Japanese endeavors to restructure their defense
policy to conform with the realities to today's multipolar world. But in
the topsy-turvy atmosphere of Japanese politics, such initiatives face a
host of obstacles. The result is that the average politician finds it easier
to abdicate responsibility than to articulate a coherent policy. Without the
necessary political guidance, Defense Agency planners have little material
from which to formulate strategic objectives— the core of any nation's
defense strategy. This absence of planning is the heart of Japan's defense
dilemma within the government. Its military consequences are to make the
SDF a force without a strategy, materially powerful but strategically
impotent. Its political expression is a hazy desire to keep all options
open as evidenced by Diet debates, not on policy substance, but on whether
policy should even exist. Since the Opposition disputes the legality of
Japan's armed forces, the government must resort to making artificial dis-
tinctions between offensive and defensive weapons to preserve its latitude
for action. The military is understandably puzzled at these arbitrary labels,
public. It should have been done long ago. Previous attempts
to publish a White Paper on defense, however, were quashed
because of political considerations! This meant that the Govern-
ment did not want to take a chance with public reaction on a sub-
ject which was considered taboo for a long time... there is
a new realization of the need at this time to seek public suport







February 23, 1972 in Daily , February 26-28, 1972, p. 11,
This pattern and its consequences are illustrated by recent Diet debate
over the Fourth Defense Plan's 1972 budget. As seen by Tokyo Shimbun ;
The confusion of the defense problem can be seen in the fact
that such questions as what defense should be and its proper
scale were not fully probed (in considering the budget for
the Fourth Plan), and that sterile arguments on such questions
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believing user intention rather than weapon design determines armament
classification.
Added to, and often compounded by, these domestic constraints on
defense policy is a technical problem which hampers the formulation of
strategic doctrine—Japan's ineffectual intelligence apparatus. First,
Tokyo has no national secrets law to protect sensitive military information.
Operating in a hostile political climate, any large intelligence activity
is therefore extremely vulnerable. Second, due to the SDF's small size and
prohibition from overseas deployment, Japan lacks the manpower abroad even
to collect surveillance data. Since it is common knowledge that "the
Defense Agency can scarcely obtain direct intelligence on the communist
131
camp, including that on the Soviet Navy," ' the government has made some
cautious attempts to strengthen collection activities. Yet Japan's capa-
bility in this area remains largely embryonic. Without the ability to gather
covert information abroad and faced with strong anti-military sentiment at
home, most SDF intelligence activities are performed by small research and
as 'whether to strengthen defense power or to maintain
defenseless neutrality' have been continued at the Diet.
It is because the Government's defense policy is
indefinite that doubts are caused as to 'militaristic
Japan' and 'military preparation to take over the U.S.




January 27, 1970 in Daily , January 28, 1970, p. 11.
Nakasone made an effort in early 1970 to increase Japan's intelligence
collection capacity. He strengthened the research staffs in the JDA, GSDF,
MSDF and ASDF, succeeded in some equipment modernization (e.g. ASW hydro-
phones) and attempted to increase the number of uniformed officers
stationed in Japanese embassies. This last request was specifically
rejected, leaving Japan with only seventeen defense officers in twelve




analysis staffs which operate with a vague mandate. Such a low-key approach
may diffuse local opposition, but it also seriously inhibits any sophisticated
evaluation of threat.
If purposeful ambiguity enhances the government's domestic freedom of
action, it likewise circumscribes Japan's international maneuverability.
Having maintained a low military profile throughout the postwar era, Japan
has placed some unique restrictions on her future behavior in Asia. A
sharp rise in Japan's armed forces would probably evoke a corresponding
increase in Chinese military preparedness since Peking would regard such an
increase outside the legitimate boundaries of Tokyo's own defense concerns
and hence an aggressive move. Indeed, in the last two years the mainland has
133
charged that renewed Japanese militarism is threatening all Asia, a
134
sentiment which has also been echoed faintly in the United States Congress.
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Most of the information in this paragraph is based on the author's con-
versations with Professor Donald C. Hellmann, Institute of Comparative and
Area Studies, University of Washington.
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See, for example, Renmin Ribao Editorial
,
"Japanese Militarism Not
Allowed to Take Old Road of Aggression," Peking Review
, Vol. 14, No. 39,
September 24, 1971, pp. 4-5.
134
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Special
Study Mission to Asia by Hon. Lester L. Wolff, dated June 21, 1971, pursuant
to H. Resoln. 143, 92nd Cong., 1st session, 1971, p. 4. Wolff cites the
following as evidence of Japanese militarism: (1) the increases in her
military budget; (2) the increased number of military personnel appearing
in world capitals on non-specific missions; (3) a fundamental redefinition
of Japan's defense perimeter "reported last year by the Wolff study mission
and since substantiated by various media reports "from Tokyo; (4) a shift
to heavy industry and basic hardware suited to military development in lieu
of consumer industries; (5) pressure to assume full control of U.S. bases
on Okinawa as well as on the home islands. Based on this sketchy data,
Wolff rather sensationally concludes that "the spirit in Japan almost implies




Although difficult to measure, such accusations have also caused some
apprenhension among Japan's trading partners in the Far East. Since they
have accepted a pacifist Japan as a fact of life in postwar years, these
countries might well overestimate the hypocrisy involved in Japanese re-
armament. With growing Chinese influence and decreasing American presence,
their fears may be more apparent than real, but: non-communist Asis forms a
trade network from which Japan cannot afford to be isolated.
The logical exit from this maze would seem to lie in a carefully
planned series of political, and eventually military, moves to change slowly
Tokyo's posture in Asia. On the surface, the Nixon-Sato Communique of
November, 1969, seemed to be the first in a possible series of such actions.
In exchange for the return of Okinawa, the White House endeavored to extract
a positive commitment by Japan to the Nixon Doctrine. Sato obliged by
calling South Korea "essential" and Taiwan "a most important factor" for
Japan's security and by affirming that "the security of countries in the
135
Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan." ' Although these
statements revealed Japan's security priorities, they gave no hint of her
intentions and were, in essence, only verbal acknowledgements that Japan
was indeed an Asian nation.
The danger of this cautious approach is that Japan may eventually be
forced to take action in a manner inconsistent with her national interests.
Lacking any firm policy guidance from Tokyo, Japan's economic penetration
135
For the complete text of the communique and Sato's January, 1970, speech
to the Washington National Press Club, see Okinawa
, Hearings
, pp. 1425-1433.
Sato's Press Club speech contained the same phraseology as the joint com-
munique. It was given considerably more weight, however, by Sec. Johnson
because it represented the unilateral statement of the Prime Minister,
"undiluted" by the possibility of compromise inherent in a joint communique.
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of Asia is proceeding in an ad hoc fashion, carrying ominous implications
for the political involvement that will inevitably follow. Japan continues
-I 0£
her economic spread into neighboring states on the assumption that
economic growth will automatically produce peace and harmony throughout the
region. Instead, she becomes increasingly dependent on raw materials from
these areas—areas where her entrepreneurs are possible scapegoats for all
manner of political problems.
As the United States withdraws from Vietnam, the security screen behind
which much of Japan's investment has been conducted will disappear, leaving
key interests exposed to the interplay of local revolutionary forces. Japan
seems to be counting on her economic weight to stabilize these volatile
areas. Such a policy is highly questionable on several grounds. First,
tangible benefits from economic growth are only realized over a long period,
137
usually thirty to forty years. It is doubtful that this slow-moving
process would significantly affect the immediate political stability of a
particular regime. Next, sharp changes in the existing growth rate may
generate destabilizing forces because many people will quickly change status,
a condition ripe for exploitation by extremist movements, and because rapid
Jonathon Unger, "Japan: The Economic Threat," Far Eastern Economic
Review
,
October 16, 1971, p. 50. A Japanese Government report released on
October 4, 1971, projected an expansion of Japan's raw material requirements
by fifteen percent per year and consequently recommended Tokyo take a more
active role in developing the resources of lesser developed countries.
137
Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread
,
(New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966) p. 27. In the words of Kuznets:
"The periods required to observe the sustained change that we identify as
economic growth are long—a minimum of thirty to forty years—because no less
a stretch of historical experience can reveal the variety of short-term
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economic growth wxll not necessarily raise general purchasing power.
Finally, predicating political stability on economic growth displays a kind
of reverse logic since institutional stability is a prerequisite for economic
development. Dependent on the accumulation of capital, economic growth
relies mainly on preserving the status quo long enough to give potential
businessmen an assured return on their long-range investments, enabling them
to acquire the capital, material and human, for future expansion. Yet this
status quo is the very condition Asian revolutionaires are committed to
change, putting Japan in direct opposition to the other major power in Asia
—
the People's Republic of China.
J
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See, for example, Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,"
Journal of Economic History
,




Relations with China dominate Japan's interaction with the rest of
139
Asia. Cultural, linguistic and racial similarities form traditional ties
between both nations while Japanese guilt over war atrocities inspires a
more recent sort of sympathy. Although these sources of attraction may be
gradually diminishing, the one-third of Japan on the political left feels an
intellectual, romantic admiration for Mao Tse-tung's socialist achievements.
These conditions, plus China's power in Asia and her proximity to Japan,
mean that developments in Peking are of extreme interest to the Japanese.
They receive copious press coverage and are followed with considerable
interest both in government and business circles. This fascination with
China has also produced a rather bizarre twist in the attitude of Japan's
public toward the PRC. Despite their general support of Japan's alignment
with the West, the Japanese citizenry tends to view normalizing relations
with China as a special case, separate from the government's overall foreign
policy stance. Besides complicating Japanese diplomacy, this type of
romanticism continues to sustain the overriding importance of Peking in
Tokyo's domestic calculations.
In contrast, the Chinese are suspicious of Japan's actions to the point
of paranoia. China's aging leadership remembers only too well the horrors
of the Pacific War and its effect on the Middle Kingdom. To this emotional
dislike is added a strong distaste for Japan as a leader of world capitalism,
139
Noriyuki Tokuda, 'Introduction: China Studies in Japan," Journal of
Social and Political Ideas in Japan (hereafter JSPIJ ) , IV (December, 1966),
9. Quoting Prime Minister Sato, "The future of Japanese diplomacy depends
entirely (on how Japan handles) the China problem."
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Peking thus perceives the spread of Japanese economic influence as the in-
evitable consequence of monopoly capital's need to exploit other countries
to fuel its own expansion.
With their different views of each other, it is hardly surprising that
the postwar pattern of Sino-Japanese relations has been quite erratic.
After some limited trade and cultural exchanges from 1952 to 1958, Peking
abruptly broke off relations to protest the strong anti-communist policy of
the Kishi government. Since 1960, Japan has followed the doctrine of
"separating politics and economics," resulting in the steady growth of trade
despite fluctuations in the PRC's political stance. From 1962 until the
present, trade has been of two types: Memorandum Trade administered under
140
annually negotiated agreements and "friendly firm" trade conducted with
individual Japanese companies not hostile to Peking. Although the vast
China market is still the Utopia of every Japanese businessman, total trade
141
in 1970 was only $826 million, about two percent of Tokyo's GNP.
The major roadblock to normal Sino-Japanese contacts has been Taiwan.
By virtue of her 1952 Peace Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, Japan created a
permanent source of political tension which has been periodically aggravated
by both sides. The most recent example was Peking's reaction to the Nixon-
Sato Communique. The Prime Minister's reference to the importance of Taiwan
for Japan's security ignited an outpouring of vituperation about Japanese
140
The initial Memorandum Trade agreement covered 'the period from 1962 to
1967. Since 1968 the agreement has been renegotiated annually, giving
Peking a yearly political forum from which to denounce the Japanese government
141
Japan Economic Yearbook 1971, p. 69. The majority of this trade ($572
million) is Japanese exports, principally chemical fertilizer, steel and
various commodities. Primary Japanese imports are soybeans, raw silk,
clothing and animal hair.

73
militarism which still has not subsided. The reason was simply that China
interpreted this action as a form of unilateral Japanese intervention in
the Chinese civil war. Although the Taiwan disagreement has prevented formal
inter-state relations, unofficial contacts have flourished on several levels.
Tokyo has a variety of China-Japan friendship associations, makes frequent
cultural exchanges with Peking and maintains trade missions with quasi-
diplomatic privileges on the mainland.
By far the most important development in Japan's relations with China,
however, was Peking's successful atomic test in 1964. Although this explosion
142
inspired initial violent reaction in the Japanese press, the disclosure
that China had used a sophisticated U-235 weapon produced an immediate switch
in Japan's media. The new reaction was more restrained than prior outbursts
and exceedingly mild in comparison with Western commentary. Its tone of Asian
admiration was typified by a subsequent Yomuri editorial:
We feel indignant at the nuclear test itself, but we are
greatly surprised at the indomitable national spirit of
Communist China which has finally produced nuclear weapons
by enduring all hardships. It is good to leave such a
country unrestrained without admitting it to the community
of nations; that is, the United Nations? It is all the
more necessary for Japan, a neighboring country, to con-
sider the problem seriously . -*-
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Yomuri Shimbun , October 17, 1964; Asahi Shimbun , October 17, 1964; Tokyo
Shimbun
,
October 18, 1964 in Daily , October 17-19, 1964. Yomuri referred to
the Chinese "plot" in conducting the test while Asahi viewed the explosion
as "a challenge to peace." Taking the hardest line of any paper, Tokyo
Shimbun catalogued all past Chinese crimes (the Korean War, Tibet, "in-
tervention" in Indo-China) and concluded that the test would have "a great




October 25, 1964 in Daily , October 24-26, 1964.
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Press respect for Peking's atomic arms seemed to increase with each
subsequent detonation. Most commentators agreed that China's rate of
nuclear development had been extremely rapid an that such an occurrence
144
would definitely exert an influence on Japan's security planning. Even
Japan's "defense realists" veiwed China's new capacity as a political and
psychological tool, primarily for defense against the two superpowers and
145
for prestige among Third World countries. Although these observers did
not minimize Peking's threat potential, most public fears seemed to center,
not on China's nuclear weapons themselves, but on the attractiveness of
American bases in Japan as potential targets. Rather than perceiving
Peking's nuclear arsenal as a direct threat, Japanese public opinion viewed
it as merely increasing the urgency of a Sino-Japanese repproachment , a
144
For reactions to the second and third Chinese tests, see Mainichi
Shimbun
,
December 26, 1965 in Daily , December 24-27, 1965 and Yomari
Shimbun
,
February 21, 1966 in Daily , February 19-21, 1966, respectively.
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See, for example, Kiichi Saeki, "Collective Defense: A Realistic
Guarantee of Japan's Security," JSPIJ
,
IV (April, 1966) 52 and Kei
Wakaizumi in Mainichi Shimbun
,
April 14, 1966 in Daily , April 16-18, 1966,
p. 23. In the latter article, Wakaizumi states:
From a basic standpoint, Communist China has nuclearized itself
probably in order to establish its prestige and foothold as a
great power... what is important here is that Communist China's
leaders are clearly thinking of making the most effective use




Kishida Junnotsuke, Chi koku no Kakusenryoku (China's Nuclear Power),
Vol. 3, n. 71, cited by John Welfied, Japan and Nuclear China (Canberra:
Australian National University 1970), p. 24. A good sample of this feeling
is found in the third work of the Asahi Shimbun 's fifteen volume series
on Japan's security and defense problems. It blithely assures readers
that "Nuclear development does not necessarily mean there has been an in-
crease in the threat." Instead, the sense of security resulting from
possession of nuclear weapons may well modify China's attitude towards the
outside world. Japan's role is made quite explicit.
One of the practical steps that Japan can take, at the present
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view remarkably close to Opposition contentions that the threat to Japan did
not derive from China but from international tension created by the Sino-
147
American confrontation. The real danger, as proclaimed by the Opposition
and largely accepted by the populace, was that continued government adherence
to containment would force China toward a more radical posture, thereby
activating the now dormant threat of atomic weapons.
The reaction of the Japanese government to a nuclear China paralleled
public sentiment by emphasizing that Chinese weapons were essentially
defensive and that Peking had little interest in areas outside her immediate
148
borders. Tokyo likewise tried to downplay the effect of China's device
in terms of any immediate military significance, stressing the difference
time, in order to see that China's nuclear development
does not bring in its wake an increase in the Chinese
threat is to contribute to the construction of the
Chinese economy, to engage in economic cooperation, trade
and technical cooperation. Increases in cultural, educa-
tional and scientific exchanges are also concrete steps
that can be taken. Another step is to create an environ-
ment (i.e. have China join the U.N. and participate in
disarmament talks) in which China can exercise her
responsibilities as a great world power.
Since the Asahi defense series apparently enjoyed considerable popularity
and was reprinted a number of times, it seems prudent not to underestimate
its effect on public opinion.
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See, for example, Masashi Ishibashi, "Security in a Nuclear Age,"
Economist
,
May 24, 1966 in Summaries , June 6, 1966, pp. 1-7. Ishibashi
argues that the Security Treaty will merely draw an innocent Japn into an
inevitable Sino-American confrontation. Considering that one-third of Japan
supports the political left and that most Japanese feel a great reservoir of
sympathy for the PRC, it is not surprising that a majority of Japanese
citizens might favor this view. Such a stance also possesses the innate
appeal of blaming all problems with Peking on uncontrollable external cir-
cumstances, assuming that China's atomic arms must be aimed at one of the
superpowers instead of peace-loving Japan.
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between simple bomb acquisition and possessing a viable weapons system.
On the diplomatic front, Japan declined any bold moves toward formal ties
with Peking and instead endeavored to reaffirm Washington's nuclear
guarantee; the Sato-Johnson joint communique of January, 1965, produced
precisely this result. Secure in the knowledge that American strategic
might had negated any potential Chinese threat, Japan's political leader-
ship put the issue on a back burner—to be kept under study but requiring
no dramatic action.
After several years of observation, the China problem appears as
intractable as ever to the Japanese, many of whom now see China and their
country as inevitable rivals for political and territorial hegemony in
Asia. Despite the initially mild popular reaction described above, the
most important long-term consequence of China's atomic arms has been a
gradual change in public discussion of Japan's security problems. These
debates have reflected a distinct shift in the country's strategic position
from deterring a conventional Soviet threat to coping with a nuclear
Chinese menace, including open discourse on the once-taboo subject of
Japan's nuclear option. The Japanese have slowly realized that China is
now an independent variable in their security planning, posing a separate
threat from that of the U.S.S.R. Traditionally European-oriented, the
149
Japan Times
, October 18, 1964, p. 1_.
For text of the joint communique, see Department of State Bulletin
,
LII, February 1, 1965, p. 135. The communique read, in part, that
"...the President reaffirmed the United States' determination to abide by
its commitment under the (U.S. -Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security)
Treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside."
Parentheses and emphasis added.
1966 was the first year the magnitude of this change revealed itself.
See, for example, Chuo Koron February, 1966, and March, 1966; Jiyu , July,
1966, all issues in Summaries for appropriate months of 1966.
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Soviet Union has neither the interest nor the forces-in-being to conduct
extensive operations in Asia. China, on the other hand, has always been
directly concerned with the Far East and now is acquiring the means to
exert her will in the region. This distinction, plus the rising level of
media attention to Chinese atomic weapons, yields an inescapable conclusion-
Tokyo has experienced a definite increase in threat perception since 1964.
In its most general sense, this threat derives from an increased pos-
sibility of conventional aggression with China relying on her nuclear
weapons to preclude or to limit any response by the country invaded.
China's growing atomic arsenal will raise the threshold of nuclear con-
flict with the United States to the highest possible level. By judicious
selection of battleground and proper use of tactics, a nuclear Peking will
have maximum flexibility for conducting a level of insurgent activity well
below the brink of American intervention.
In a more specific context, atomic arms enable China to pursue her
objectives with fewer risks and greater potential gain. They let Peking
readily exploit opportunities arising from ambiguities in American com-
mitments in Asia, the social or political vulnerability of United States
allies in that region and instability in countries near China's perimeter.
In addition to facilitating Peking's support of local insurgencies, nuclear
weapons provide her with qualitatively more effective political-propaganda
techniques for spreading Chinese influence across the Far East. Such
changes might be achieved in any of three ways. First, American allies
would become increasingly wary of United States bases on their territory in
the face of a nuclear China. These anxieties would generate indigenous
pressure for a reappraisal of military alliances, resulting in the elimina-
tion or severe restriction of the operations at in-country military
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installations. Second, by casting doubt on American policies in Asia, the
PRC hopes to discourage Asian self-defense efforts and pull present American
allies into a more neutral, pro-Peking orbit. Finally, by exacerbating
existing frictions within a particular country, the Chinese desire to
polarize domestic opinion in the belief that an eventual confrontation of
native political forces will work to their benefit.
All of these tactics were visible in Peking's reaction to a Tokyo
decision admitting American nuclear submarines to Japanese ports. Issued
just after China's first test, this statement sought to capitalize on
Japan's public fear of nuclear weapons:
The closer the Japan-U.S. collaboration, the less guaranteed
is Japan's security. Today U.S. imperialism is brandishing
its nuclear weapons in Asia, making active preparations for
nuclear war. If it eventually starts such a war, Japan, as a
U.S. nuclear base, is bound to bear the brunt and will in-
evitably be pushed into the abyss of nuclear calamity. The
Japanese Government willingly acts as an accomplice in U.S.
imperialism's nuclear war preparations— this is an extremely
dangerous road by which the Japanese nation is led to a
bottomless nuclear chasm.
This article was an excellent example of the propaganda potential of
Peking's atomic arsenal. Yet all subsequent Chinese actions have been
carefully measured in order to prevent fearful neighbors from taking
153




"The Sato Government Knows Which Way the Wind
Blows," Peking Review
,
Vol. 7 No. 48, November 27, 1964, pp. 17-18. This
article was the only Chinese statement that hinted, even indirectly, at
the threat of force against an Nth country. For a complete analysis, see
Morton Halperin, China's Nuclear Strategy: The Early Post-Detonation
Period
,
Adelphi Paper No. 18, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies,
1965), pp. 12-13.
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Good examples of this strategy are repeated Chinese assertions that they
will never be the first to use special weapons and that they only acquired
nuclear arms to break the superpower monopoly.
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potential competitors as India and Japan, Peking has likewise refrained
from any specific explanation of how her nuclear capability could be applied
to assist national liberation movements. By not detailing the strategic
utility of her weapons, China generates an amorphous sense that a great
power stands behind revolutionary struggles throughout Asia. This non-
specific threat exerts maximum political influence while not furnishing
her potential rivals with particular pretexts to justify their own armament
efforts.
Such a Chinese strategy has been relatively successful in the short-run;
the emergence of a "moderate" foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution
has also mitigated Japanese fears for the present. But for a regime which
has not faced the succession crisis and is committed to fundamental revolu-
tionary change, alterations in current external policy appear highly
probable. Should Peking choose to employ its nuclear leverage as described
earlier, an exposed Japan would face a series of agonizing decisions.
In the long-run, Japan's threat perception cannot help but increase
as China's nuclear capability grows. Latest studies forecast that by 1975
China will have its first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM),
capable of propelling a three megaton hydrogen bomb 6,000 miles to the
154
western United States or any point in the Soviet Union. The PRC pre-
sently has the TU-16, a medium range jet bomber, in series production and
will probably make this aircraft its principle delivery system for the
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Edward K. DeLong, "Red China's Military Power Demands Respect," Seattle
Post-Intelligencer Feb. 20, 1972, p. A5 . This UPI report uses the official
1972 Pentagon estimates and like figures from London's Institute for
Strategic Studies to calculate China's military potential. It states that
by 1980 Peking's ICBM capability will be sufficent to present a real threat
to both superpowers. The report also says that in the last year China has
completed deployment of up to 20 MRBM's, capable of striking targets from
600 to 1,000 miles away. The next phase in her strategic buildup will pro-
bably involve deployment of several IRBM;s with a 2,500 mile range.
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immediate future. Dispersed at airfields throughout China and possessing
a 2,000 mile range, these aircraft are increasingly less vulnerable to a
preemptive strike and are capable of reaching any target in the Far East.
With the PRC's improving delivery system and her growing stockpile of fissile
material, the visibility of Washington's nuclear guarantee would need to
increase accordingly to remain credible in Tokyo. This direct proportion
exists because Peking's atomic arsenal is not measured against any absolute
level of American forces; instead it is weighed against sensitivities of
Asian states which are already sharpened to a fine point by inordinate fears
of nuclear war.
From 1964 to 1967, the balance between American credibility and Chinese
capability remained reasonably stable, but since 1968 the former has been
in rapid decline while the latter has steadily increased. On a purely
strategic level, billing the Safeguard system as an "anti-Chinese" ABM may
have produced domestic advantages but it in effect portrayed Tokyo as
Washington's nuclear lightning rod in the Pacific. More importantly, an
entire series of unilateral American actions, capped by President Nixon's
symbolic pilgrimage to Peking, severely shook Japan's confidence in the
United States. The result is an abrupt change in the tenor of Sino-Japanese
relations. Although it is too early to tell what direction this change will
take, much of the blame for the alleged failure of Japan's China policy may
Based on American intelligence estimates cited by Charles H. Murphy,
"Mainland China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientist
,
XXVIII (January 1972), 32. Peking should have around 130 TU-16's
by mid-1972. The TU-16 is roughly equivalent to the obsolete B-47 strategic
bomber of the United States.
Ibid
. ,
p. 29. With the combined output of her gaseous diffusion plants




be placed squarely on Washington. This condition is unfortunately symtomatic
of Tokyo's peculiar relationship with her principal ally and is directly




Postwar relations between Japan and the United States have been intimate
and friendly. A great deal of this feeling derived from the Occupation when
General MacArthur and his staff literally remade Japan in the American
image. Since the United States became the new benchmark against which
Japan's behavior was measured, it is hardly surprising that a considerable
degree of rapport should develop. Yet these unique circumstances obscured
the fact that one country was Occidental and the other Oriental with the
associated racial, cultural and linguistic differences. Any reference to
the close nature of the relationship must be viewed in that perspective.
In retrospect, the Occupation bred a kind of mass Japanese dependence
on the United States. It set a precedent for non- involvement in inter-
national affairs which which was initially compatible with economic growth
but which became increasingly difficult to maintain after 1960. The crux
of this dependency was Japanese security. To rid herself of the Occupation,
Tokyo had little choice but to sign the 1951 Security Treaty. The Treaty
permitted American bases in Japan, giving Washington a vital staging area
to defend Korea and later to regulate United States' activities throughout
Asia. Japan obtained a visible defense guarantee for the home islands and
a steady flow of American dollars.
While this exchange was highly successful in the bipolar world of the
1950' s, lately a rising Japanese self-confidence, born of economic prosperity
The official Occupation goals were the demilitarization and the democra-
tization of Japan. To achieve the latter objective, the United States wrote
Japan's new Constitution, established labor unions, instituted land reform,
abolished the zaibatsu and implemented countless lesser reforms.
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and cultural distinctiveness, has made foreign military bases very unpopular.
Although the United States has greatly reduced its military posture in
1 CO
Japan, these alterations have been dictated primarily by American con-
siderations of economics and military utility. From the purely political
viewpoint of most Japanese, American bases have no useful function and are
merely vestiges of the Occupation.
These differences in outlook have been a constant source of tension of
which Okinawa is the most recent and dramatic example. Designed to maintain
a Pacific defense structure against China, this base had outlived its
strategic value by 1960. But considerations of military convenience, re-
inforced by the Vietnam War, prevented its early reversion to Japan despite
mounting Japanese discontent. When the island finally returned to Tokyo's
administrative control on May 15, 1972, the United States was not praised for
its support of native sovereignty but was instead castigated for years of
diplomatic intransigence. This episode indicates one point of disequilibrium
in Japanese-American relations: Washington tends to see matters in strictly
strategic terms while Tokyo always refracts them through the prism of its
domestic politics.
A potentially more troublesome problem is the current economic strain
between the two nations. After unselfishly assisting in Japan's postwar
recovery, the United States is haunted by the spectre of a former pupil now
more adept than the teacher. Much of Japan's economic success stemmed from




testimony of U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1153. Since 1952,
United States' military bases and facilities have been reduced from about
3800 to 125 (as of January, 1970).
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She has been able to protect her own industry while extending her foreign
trade through the free trade principle and ignoring the basic requirement of
mutual gain through trade. By using quotas, charging special duties, limit-
ing foreign investment and undervaluing their currency, the Japanese have
reaped all the benefits of free trade. They have exercised economic tunnel
vision, refusing to acknowledge that their one-sided trade policies would
159
eventually be counter-productive. When the inevitable American backlash
came in 1971, Tokyo's reaction was, predictably, stunned and critical.
One reason for Japan's bitter reaction was her economic dependence on
the United States. First, only ten percent of Japan's reserves are gold;
the remainder are held in American dollars. Second, about thirty percent of
Japan's total trade is with the United States. This relationship breeds
not only simple commercial dependence but also a distinct vulnerability to
general economic trends in the United States. Most importantly, it makes
Japan especially susceptible to any protectionist moves in American trade
policy.
Not one, but a series of such moves occurred in 1971. President Nixon
first imposed a ten percent surcharge on all imports on August 15, then con-
cluded a "voluntary" textile agreement with Japan and several other Asian
nations on October 15. He finally removed the surcharge only in exchange
for a 16.88 percent revaluation of the yen and other world currencies in
159
The irony of Tokyo's position has not been lost on Japanese commentators.
See Kiyoshi Nasu, "Postwar Greatest Crisis in U.S.—Japan Relations," Jiyu
,
August, 1971 in Summaries
,
September, 1971, p. 18.
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December. Japan's reaction to the surcharge was largely psychological since
she was already in the midst of a mild recession, caused principally by a
sharp decline in capital spending. Nixon's actions thus had little trace-
abel effect in an economic sense, but their impact on Japanese attitudes was
significant. In the words of one observer, "The Japanese have been living
in a myth; the myth of the dollar shock. It is a huge Kabuki play to
• i i • -I r !|161
attribute everything to August 15.
If Japan overreacted to the import surcharge and subsequent yen re-
valuation, she had more concrete grievances over the October textile agree-
ment. The dispute originated in a 1968 Nixon campaign pledge to southern
senators to curb overseas fabric imports. The President apparently ex-
tracted a verbal promise during Sato's 1969 visit that the Prime Minister
would arrest the textile flow from Japan. In the face of local resistance,
Sato procrastinated until, after a series of clumsy moves on both sides,
the United States literally bludgeoned Japan into submission. Since Japanese
concessions were at least implicitly tied to Okinawa's reversion and Asian
textiles only accounted for five percent of the American market, Japan felt
that Nixon had purposefully traded on her goodwill for domestic political
gain.
The lesson from these events is fairly basic: The United States and
Japan are economic competitors today and this type of friction will in-
evitably rise in the future. Faced with an annual $3 to 4 billion balance-
of-payments deficit with Japan, Washington will be increasingly inclined
1 fii 1






, Oct. 18, 1971, p. 28. This agreement limited the
growth of Japanese manmade fiber imports to five percent per year and re-
stricted the growth of her woolen textile imports to one percent a year.
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toward protectionist policies. This tendency will be particularly strong
since production costs in American industry remain high while competitive
163
Japan shows continued reluctance to liberalize her import restrictions.
The result is a politically passive but economically aggressive Japan con-
fronting an economically sluggish but politically powerful United States.
This explosive potential in economic relations is likely to be ex-
acerbated by several cultural phenomena. Perhaps the most obvious of these
is the difference in public outlook between the two nations. All major
events in the United States are likewise big news in Japan, but American
press coverage of Japanese actions is cursory and casual. The informed
Japanese receives ample information about American life-styles and behavior
patterns while his overseas counterpart has only a mindless image of masses
of smiling little people, hardworking but inscrutable, living in a pic-
turesque country of pagodas and geisha girls. Such perceptions lead to
neglect of Japan's importance in world affairs and, more seriously, produce
gross misconceptions of Japanese actions and the motives which underlie them,
Japanese attitudes are also frequently misunderstood by the American
government and its negotiators. Part of the difficulty lies with the nature
of the Japanese language itself. Structured to avoid the direct and precise
exposition of conflict, the language is intentionally vague when expressing
notions of peaceful disagreement but is ideally suited to the Japanese pen-
chant for consensual, indirect decision-making. Western frankness is,
Ibid
. , Jan. 10, 1972, p. 14. Even if Japan ostensibly relaxes a quota,
other means are often substituted to protect the interest involved. For
instance, when the government, with great fanfare, eliminated the import
quota on live cattle in October, 1971, American sellers figured they had a
ready market. They soon found duties had been added
—
$244 for a calf over
600 pounds, for example—which effectively prohibited sales.
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therefore, often brutally offensive to Japanese sensibilities, making
negotiations an exercise in open confrontation and public pressure. The
heart of the problem is a simple failure to communicate produced by cultural
and linguistic differences. Each side always listens to the other's argu-
ments but frequently neither party really hears what its counterpart has
said.
Looking at the problem from the Japanese side of the negotiating, table,
a candid statement by Foreign Minister Ohira is revealing:
In the Oriental world, there is the expression communion of
mind with mind, and if you look at the other person's counte-
nance, you usually understand what the other side is thinking
or feeling. When someone asks you to adopt something without
fail and if you reply, 'Well, I think about it,' it immediately
becomes clear to the other person that you will not approve it.
The Japanese people live in this kind of Oriental civilization.
They are able to communicate with each other unexpectedly well
even with such vague expressions. .. .Americans are people who do
not show interest in general discussion. In other words, it
does not constitute understanding to them unless everything is
made concrete in a contract... The Japanese people often say
that they held completely frank talks with Americans. However,
there are many things which the other side failed to understand.
It is like their being on the first floor and our being on the
second floor, so to speak, and if the wrestlers are separated
on the first and the second floors, you cannot grapple with each
other. 164
Despite a variety of formal communication channels, confrontation in-
variably occurs when negotiations pit the American adversary system of
justice against the Japanese consensus-building approach. Japanese tend to
be overly concerned with short-term economic or political gains, taking
rigid positions which, when finally compromised, make the resultant
164





January, 1972, p. 9. There were reported instances during the
textile negotiations of Japanese remarks that, "we will think of it," be-
ing recorded as "yes" by the American side. For a further account, see
Ryuji Takeuchi, "Realities and Future of U.S.—Japan Relations," Seisaku
Kenkyu
,
January, 1972 in Summaries
, January 1972, p. 36, passim .
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concessions look more like extortion. Americans do not clearly articu-
late their positions, fail to exploit the elements of honor and sentiment
in the Japanese character, and thus alternate between a highly paternalistic
attitude and blustering threats, neither of which encourage flexibility in
the Japanese position. Differences in form are compounded by those in sub-
stance so that the established institutional means of resolving conflicts
are seldom adequate. This combination produces an all to predictable pattern
of neglect, irritation and ultimate crisis as evidenced by the Okinawa and
textile issues.
Added to cultural, political and economic tensions is a growing un-
certainty about the future American role in Asia. Soviet parity with the
United States in strategic arms, the rise of Russian naval power in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans and the emergence of China's once embryonic nuclear
capability have clearly reduced Washington's ability to sustain a military
preponderance in the Far East. No less dramatic, however, has been the
decline of the general American will to maintain such a posture in the wake of
an unacknowledged defeat in Vietnam. Unable to translate superior firepower
into success on the battlefield and faced with mounting casualties and domestic
opposition, Washington has elected to withdraw from the conflict and avoid
commitments which might, at some future date, lead to a repeat of the Indo-
china debacle.
The now famous Nixon Doctrine was merely the first step down this new
road. First put forth in July, 1969, the Doctrine was given further support
For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Zbigniew Brzezinski,




by the President in his "State of the World" message in February, 1970:
The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens
the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation
whose survival we consider vital to our security and the
security of the region as a whole. In cases involving
other types of aggression we shall furnish military and
economic assistance when required and as appropriate. But
we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume
the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for
its defense. 1^6
In a similar message the following year, Nixon pointed to combat operations
in Cambodia and Laos, conducted with United States military assistance but
without American ground forces, as concrete illustrations of the Nixon
Doctrine in action.
For Tokyo, the key question of this Doctrine will be its effect on the
American-Japanese security system. As a competitor with China for political
influence in Asia, Japan is rapidly adopting a pattern of regional behavior.
It seems doubtful that an alliance fashioned against the backdrop of global
bipolarity can continue to guarantee Japan's security in the multipolar con-
text of East Asia. The Nixon Doctrine, an effort to mitigate American
military preponderance throughout the Far East, is an implicit recognition
of this fact. It entails costs for both sides: the United States will give
up much of the direct control over regional activities she once enjoyed;
Japan will forego the luxury of assured protection which has given her con-
siderable freedom of action over the past two decades. Although the
Washington-Tokyo alliance will remain essential in post-Vietnam Asia, it will
be subjectively less satisfying and objectively less adequate to both
1 fS6
"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970' s. A New Strategy for Peace." A
Report by Richard M. Nixon to the Congress (Feb. 18, 1970), Department of
State Bulletin
, Vol. LXII, March 9, 1970, p. 294.
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governments as a medium for projecting American power or protecting Japanese
interests. If the Nixon Doctrine presages the limitation of United States
obligations and responsibilities entailed in all its existing commitments,
the Security Treaty may eventually function more to contain Japan than to
167
restrict China.
Seen in this light, the President's visit to Peking in February, 1972,
was much more than a simple move to implement his Doctrine. From inception
to execution, Nixon's China odyssey was the largest in the series of geo-
political earthquakes to hit Japan since mid-1971. First, Washington gave
Tokyo only a few minutes prior notice before publicly announcing the historic
event. This procedure confirmed a long-standing Japanese suspicion that,
in any really important Asian diplomacy, the United States would go it
-I (L O
alone. Second, the psychological impact of an American President in
Peking, the constant television coverage and the agreement to reduce United
States military forces on Taiwan left the Japanese in a state of severe
169
shock. This last point was particularly troublesome for most Japanese
1 f)7
For further discussion of this point, see Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and
American Foreign Policy
,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968)
pp. 79 and 159.
See, for example, New York Times
,
July 23, 1971, p. 5. In reference to the
surprise announcement of the Nixon visit, Japanese government sources are
quoted as saying, "...all our suspicions of big-powerism are reawakened. It
used to be the U.S. and the Soviet Union deciding the fate of the world. Now
it looks as though the U.S. and China will decide the fate of Asia."
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Bob Considine, "Japanese in Severe State of Shock," Seattle Post-
Intelligencer
,
Mar. 9, 1972, p. A8. Considine reports of Assistant Secretary
of State Marshall Green's trip to Japan (to mend fences after Nixon's Peking
journey): "Green did a lot of good here. The most important thing he did
was to quiet down the almost psychopathic fears the Japanese have that they
might be left behind, left in the lurch, by the swift turn of events." For
a good example of these "psychopathic" Japanese fears, see the results of a
top level Foreign Ministry meeting on February 26, 1972. Yomuri Shimbun
,
February 27, 1972 in Daily , March 2, 1972, p. 24.
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officials. They quite literally believed that the United States, in a single
momentous stroke, had abandoned its commitment to Formosa, violating
Nixon's solemn promises to the contrary in his San Clemente meeting with
Sato a month earlier.
Although the passage of time will probably lessen Japanese fears about
Taiwan, it will likely deepen anxiety over Washington's future role in Asia.
For Japan, the real importance of Nixon's China trip was not so much a
concern over substantive matters, but their recognition, for the first time,
that the United States is in the midst of a fundamental realignment, con-
ventional and strategic, in the Far East. The trip was a dramatic illustra-
tion of one possible goal of the Nixon Doctrine: To square accounts with
the PRC in preparation for a major American withdrawal from all Asia. The
Doctrine does not presently signify this course but, given a Vietnam-weary
public, it could ultimately aim for such an objective. The total "shock"
Japan has received, ranging from Nixon's economic moves to his Peking
See, for example, "Somebody Loves You," Far Eastern Economic Review
,
March 4, 1972, p. 3 and Nihon Keizai Shimbun , March 14, 1972 in Daily
,
March 14, 1972, p. 2. In this latter source, Japan's ambassador (to the
United States) Ushiba even found Henry Kissinger's post-China breifing un-
satisfactory:
The Japanese Government did not receive any convincing
explanations on important points, such as the United
States and Chinese policies toward the Taiwan question
and toward the Soviet Union, discussed at the Sino-U.S.
summit talks, even from Special Assistant Kissenger...
United States' policy toward Taiwan is more advanced
than the explanation which the Japanese Government has
been receiving from the United States.
This article was one of many reporting Japanese fears of a "secret deal"
over Taiwan between Washington and Peking.
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sojourn, was the frightening spectre of a neo-isolationist , inward-turning
United States—a ghost that is currently haunting all American allies.
These factors combined have produced, within the Japanese-American
partnership, a diminished sense of a community of interests, a Japanese
tendency to question the value of the American commitment and an American
inclination to question the extent of its own present commitment.
Washington's attitude is embodied in the Nixon Doctrine, but Tokyo's feel-
ings have yet to be adequately expressed. Whether in the press, government
or business, Japanese are taking a more critical look at the United States
because of recent external events as well as a rising national pride pro-
duced by economic prosperity. This assertive mood is not anti-American but
could easily move in that direction given the strong emotional undercurrent
in relations between the two countries. Economic or security problems could
provide the spark to ignite this trend; while the consequences in either
sphere would be serious, it is in the defense area where the possibility of
lasting damage is greatest.
Both Washington and Tokyo would probably agree that the Security Treaty
should be slowly modified to take account of Japan's increased political
status and augmented capacity for self-defense. But while the United States
sees this alteration in terms of "burden sharing," Japan's desire is
limited to the strictly political realm of more autonomy in international
affairs. As Japan cautiously searches for a more independent world role,
an impatient United States is quite likely to push her into an anti-American
definition of that role. Washington often fails to consider that its
leverage in changing Japanese-American relations is essentially limited to
negative acts, such as withdrawal from present commitments or economic

93
protectionism, which ultimately produce a severe backlash. In the case of
United States' pressures for a greater Japanese military role in Asia,
this danger is particularly acute. Only a domestic awareness of political
necessity—not compulsion by Washington—will induce Japan to develop a
national and regional defense capability. If the American government
ignores the complexities of Japan's domestic scene, it runs the grave risk
of arousing deep and lasting emnity without having prevented Japanese nuclear
armament
.
For instance, see New York Times , July 8, 1971, p. 3. In his recent visit
to Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Laird reportedly urged increased Japanese
defense spending after completion of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan. He
told government officials that the United States could no longer bear the
entire responsibility for nuclear deterrence and conventional protection
against the Soviet and Chinese threats in the post-Vietnam period. To
obtain the same degree of deterrence they have enjoyed in the past, American
allies would have to contribute more than they have thus far. Laird's re-
marks were billed as the first explicit statement, although they contained





Not surprisingly, postwar Japan's foreign policy has been influenced
greatly by domestic determinants. Public opinion, party factionalism, in-
stitutional deficiencies and socio-economic problems have all constrained
Japanese policy-makers, establishing both the general nature of policy
objectives and the flexibility of means employed in their pursuit. S.ince
this complicated process must ultimately arbitrate any nuclear debate, its
general dynamics must be analyzed before considering specific issues.
Public opinion is the most visible system constraint on government
actions, but a distinction between effective public opinion and opinions
held by the public must first be made. The latter are reflected in public
opinion polls while the former exert real influence on decision makers.
Effective public opinion, moreover, can be divided into two forms, mass
172
mood and articulated opinion.
Mass mood is the climate of opinion surrounding every policy-maker.
It includes broad feelings such as national pride as well as attitudes
directed towards specific nations or peoples. Seldom clearly expressed,
this atmosphere shapes long-range objectives instead of short-term
decisions. But for mass mood to have any impact on government actions, it
needs spokesmen. Whether large organizations or private citizens, these
intermediaries selectively transmit mass opinion to decision-makers; their
statements constitute articulate opinion. Public demonstrations or appeals
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These distinctions are drawn from a model of Japan's internal politics
presented in Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic




to authority by prestigious individuals are its common modes of expression
and, because of its focus on particular issues, such opinion exerts a more
direct influence on government. Articulate opinion can affect government's
behavior by defining the context within which any decision is made and by
informing politicians what consequences their actions will have. Yet the
responsiveness of these decision-makers, dictated as much by personalities
of individual leaders and the elite political culture as by the immediate
exigencies of situation, will ultimately determine the effects of public
opinion.
Regretfully, their political culture suggests Japanese leaders will
react only to extreme expressions of popular opinion. The conservative
173
Liberal Democratic Party has dominated Japanese politics since 1945.
Composed largely of prewar bureaucrats drawn from the top universities, the
conservatives have perpetuated a long history of self-conscious aloofness
among government officials. Nearly one quarter of the LDP are officials
who have already completed a career in the executive branch of government
while fifty to seventy-five percent have had some former links to the busi-
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ness community. These two categories form a series of in-groups, both
before and during their tenure as politicians, where intimate connections
are built around school, ministry and family ties. Because the conserva-
tives have yet to be confronted with a serious electoral challenge, they
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1945.
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have lacked any practical incentive to heed the public.
Drawing its main support from businessmen, farmers and self-employed
workers, the LDP has been the beneficiary of Japan's postwar economic boom.
In the face of this tremendous socio-economic change, the average Japanese
citizen has been most concerned with domestic, practical and highly personal
issues. Rising prices, traffic problems, educational opportunities and
social security benefits consistently outrank foreign and defense policy as
major voter concerns in public opinion polls. With good local organiza-
tion and heavy emphasis on economic growth, the conservatives have exploited
these desires and forced the opposition parties to look elsewhere for votes.
Unfortunately, two problems cloud this otherwise bright outlook for the LDP:
First, the need to foster rapid growth or court electoral disaster; second,
the steady erosion of its rural base of support. To date the conservatives
have prevented an absolute drop in their power by blocking any attempt to
redistrict. The result is that twenty percent of Japan's population,
laborers in agriculture and other primary industries, hold sixty-two percent
1 7 ft
of the Diet seats while the LDP's total popular strength has consistently
declined since 1952. Meanwhile, an increasing alienation among
See, for example, Mainichi Shimbun, May 12, 1969 in Daily, May 10-12,
1969, p. 30 and Shigeki Nishihira, "opinion Surveys on the Sato Cabinet and
Territorial and Defense Problems," Jivu
,
April, 1968 in Summaries
,
April
22-29, 1968, pp. 20-22.
Gerald L. Curtis, "Conservative Dominance in Japanese Politics," Current
History Vol. 60 (April, 1971), 208.
U.S. - Japanese Political Relations: The Critical Issues Affecting
Asia's Future ("Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic
Studies, 1969), p. 47. The figures for all elections since 1952 are:
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disenfranchized urban voters promises trouble for the conservatives.
Although current conservative supremacy suggests considerable freedom
for policy maneuver, party factionalism severely limits any prime minister's
policy execution. Initially a product of prewar practice and postwar cir-
cumstance, the individual habatsu , or faction, has come to dominate all
Japan's political parties. Today the diffuse manner in which political
funds are raised and the peculiarities of Japanese electoral law merely
reinforce these long-established tendencies toward the fragmentation of
178
power. Factions themselves are personality-centered organizations for
the acquisition and allocation of political power. They are not formed by
agreement on issues but instead through private deals and patronage con-
siderations with the ultimate objective of propelling a particular man into
a position of party leadership. Since the Prime Minister is selected by
the Diet members of the majority party, the LDP is little more than an










Hans H. Baerwald, "Factional Politics in Japan," Current History
,
Vol.
46 (April, 1964), 224-225. Under the current system of campaign financing,
individual politicians receive more money from their faction leader than
from the central party treasury, breeding personal rather than party
allegiance. Furthermore, in each of Japan's 118 electoral districts, three,
four or five candidates run for Japan's House of Representatives, yet each voter
may vote for only one. The result is that LDP candidates often must run
against each other within a single district, meaning that each candidates'
personal organization is more important for securing victory than uncertain
and limited party support.
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alliance of factions bound together by political expediency. All promoting
their man for Prime Minister or a suitable cabinet post, party members owe
their allegiance to individual faction leaders rather than any central
figure.
The locus of political power resides in the intraparty decision-making
process of the conservatives since they control the Diet. But effective
policy leadership is inherently limited by the coalition nature of the
government. The Prime Minister cannot furnish strong policy guidance unless
he risks upsetting the factional balance which keeps him in power—in effect
staking his future on the outcome of a specific issue. This condition is
further aggravated by the Japanese tradition of consensual authority. Before
producing a decision, extensive consultation is required among party factions,
and they must give at least their tacit consent before the Prime Minister
can take action. But to build a consensus requires broad support which like-
wise implies appealing to as divergent a group as possible. The product is
a policy born of ambiguity with the final decision making itself on the
basis of accumulated data. In the realms of economics and domestic politics,
where data is readily available and generally quantifiable, such a process
has a chance for success, but in the bewildering, fast-moving world of
foreign affairs, this policy paralysis can have dire consequences.
This immobilism is reinforced by the institutional framework within
which the LDP formulates Japan's external policy. The most prominent in-
stitutions are the Foreign Office and the Diet. The Foreign Office is
totally subordinated to the ruling party. It seldom has an active policy
input but instead serves as a faithful executor of previously authorized
programs. Functioning primarily as an implementor, it has of necessity

99
been concerned with the technical details of policy and with administration
of Japan's international and regional activities. Contrary to prewar days,
today's foreign minister is usually a party man with little experience in
179
foreign affairs. Thus, under his control, the logical institution for
directly shaping foreign policy and indirectly affecting defense require-
ments is only a passive participant in Japanese politics.
The Diet, too, lacks a positive role in the foreign policy process.
Since strict party discipline is observed within this chamber, conservative
politicians are powerless to criticize openly the official party stand.
Yet members of the Opposition are similarly impotent for a variety of
reasons. Composed of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) the Japanese Com-
munist Party (JCP) , the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito
,
the Opposition purposefully focuses most of its energies on foreign policy.
This emphasis dramatizes its differences with the government but also
encourages extreme interparty and intraparty conflicts which undermine
effective coordination against the LDP. Although the JSP and JCP have
strong Marxist orientations, all the Opposition parties share a common
motivational drive in Japanese nationalism and all agree on the importance
of Japan's security; their divergence exists on the appropriate means to
180
achieve security. Nevertheless, the wide ideological gap between left
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,
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 36.
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The basic defense policies of Japan's opposition parties are:
The JSP favors peaceful diplomacy based on "unarmed neutrality"
guaranteed by a quadripartite nonaggression agreement among the U.S.,
U.S.S.R., China and Japan. This policy would also entail renunciation of
the 1960 Security Treaty and a gradual reduction of the SDF.
The DSP leans toward a strict neutrality similar to Nehru's non-
alignment policy. They would work for gradual modification of the Security
Treaty, eventual withdrawal of American troops from Japan and cooperation
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and right merely sharpens Diet debate and, since Liberal Democrats hold the
majority, makes compromise both impossible and unnecessary. Under these
circumstances, no place exists for the loyal opposition. Instead of pro-
viding responsible criticism, the Socialists often aim merely to obstruct
and embarass the government, making the Diet dysfunctional to the foreign
policy process.
In contrast to the structural problems in its formal organizations,
Japan's political culture contains several less tangible elements which
might inhibit her external actions. Foremost of these conditions is the
strong influence of morality in all Japanese actions. Originating from
Japan's insular position and her disasterous military adventures of the
past, this vague notion breeds a "peace at any price" mentality among
many Japanese. Its Utopian ideal is the "unarmed neutrality" of the JSP,
but its more simple explanation is a desire to remain friends with all
nations in a complex world. Although the intensity of this commitment may
be questioned, it has served to legitimatize violent political protest in
Japan. With a ready pool of student manpower, the JSP has been able to
stage large, disruptive demonstrations which are tolerated by an emotion-
ally sympathetic public. The result is a permanently disaffected minority,
with the Free World through the United Nations.
The Komeito espouses a "perfect neutrality" where the SDF is absorbed
into the U.N. police force. This stance would involve liquidation of the
Security Treaty within ten to twenty years, expansion of economic and
technical aid and refusal to enter any military alliances.
The JCP favors rewriting the Constitution to strengthen the SDF. It
also advocates substituting an alliance with the Soviet bloc for the cur-
rent Japanese - U.S. Security Treaty.
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subject to swift radicalization, which is able to exploit any foreign affairs
issue on abstract spiritual grounds. In this unique milieu, the content of
protest is not as important as its style; obstructive dissent, left or right,
has been institutionalized and is a continuing source of instability in
postwar Japan.
Although not necessarily destabilizing, social welfare problems promise
to be a strong competitor for Japan's resources in the future. Rapid urbani-
zation has spawned greater taxes, increased juvenile delinquency, rural
poverty and pollution while fueling demands for more housing, transporta-
tion, education and sanitation facilities. Such needs are presently spark-
ing a debate on national priorities; its full impact has not yet hit
181
Japan. Added to these material problems are social ills of a less
visible, but no less profound, significance. The frustration produced by
the hierarchical Japanese seniority system is a typical example of this
phenomenon. It means that the transfer of power is slow and deliberate,
producing tremendous pressures for youth to conform while refusing them
sufficient responsibility to engender job satisfaction. The normal
"generation gap," shallow bases of political parties, and breakup of the
traditional family are similar ailments. Although their importance is not
easy to measure, as the modern Japanese man gropes for a new identity,
such conflicts should have a substantial effect on public opinion.
Japan's freedom of action in global affairs is thus circumscribed
sharply by the primacy of her domestic troubles. Twenty-five years under
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Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 132. The beginnings of this
trend were evidenced by adoption of the Government's Comprehensive National
Plan in 1968. This program illustrated the "basic direction of general
land development" and the "allocation of social capital" through 1985. It
was billed as a blueprint for promoting industrial decentralization and




the American wing has reduced any need to focus on difficult security ques-
tions. Foreign policy remains the major contentious issue in Japanese
politics, but quality of discussion suffers from the highly moralistic and
intensely ideological character that the debate has assumed. The result is
a government which literally cannot afford to make up its mind on defense
matters since Japan's public attitude toward this subject is uniquely
legalistic and sentimental, not strategic and realistic. Next, continued
conservative dominance has produced a tyranny of the majority in many in-
stances, causing the Opposition to reject parliamentarism as the final
arbiter of political issues. Consequently, the Opposition has a vested
interest in non-cooperation. With little hope of being elected, the JSP
has few inducements to moderate its views or streamline its demands; it
appeals to militants within its own ranks rather than the political center
of the elctorate and pursues policies which are idealogically satisfying
but politically unrealistic.
A good example of this political standoff is the defense philosophies
of Japan's two major parties. The JSP's unarmed neutrality appeals largely
to a naive public who "imagine that international politics is a kindergarten
1 R2
playground where we can hold hands and make friends with everybody."
This unworkable alternative basically disregards Japan's security, assuming
that other nations will never use military means to resolve a clash of
1 O O
national interests with Tokyo. In contrast, the LDP appears to have no
1 o o
Yonosuke Nagai, "Japanese Foreign Policy Objectives in a Nuclear Milieu,"
JSPIJ
,
V (April, 1967), 29.
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Even some JSP leaders have admitted the impracticality of this ideal.
See "Japanese Socialist Party's Course Toward 1970," interview with
Shichiro Matsumoto and Masashi Ishibashi, Gendai No Me
,
(December, 1966) in
Summaries, November 21, 1966, p. 71. In this interview, Ishibashi explicitly
recognized that the Security Treaty and the SDF had to be maintained until
non-aggression pacts were concluded with Moscow and Peking. Implicit in this
statement was the notion that if his party were unable to consumate these pacts,
some alternative would be necessary to ensure Japan's security.
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intention of adopting any defense policy other than a form of armed
deterrence. But the conservatives' public stance only offers the
Security Treaty as an alternative security policy, discussing autonomous
defense mainly in hypothetical terms. The LDP officially refuses to
acknowledge that excessive reliance on Washington may soon pose as great a
threat to Japan's sovereignty as socialist neutralism does to her security.
Two additional domestic factors, one economic and the other political,
also limit Japan's international maneuverability. First, economic progress
has yielded a large middle class which is essentially shut out of a political
process controlled mostly by LDP business interests and JSP labor concerns.
Although the DSP and the Komeito have gained strength from this constituency,
neither has the foundation necessary to capture all the center ground. How
and under what circumstances this group is mobilized will have great
significance to Japanese politics. Second, factionalism within the LDP
discourages bold leadership while inviting vigorous Left opposition. The
frantic factional maneuvering and atmosphere of excitement surrounding this
process merely obscures the lack of basic policy shifts and the minimal
184
See, for example, Kiichi Aichi, "Let Us Look at Reality As It Is,"
Asahi Journal
,
July 6, 1969, and "'Unarmed Neutrality Argument' is an
Illusion," Bungei Shunju
,
May, 1969 in Summaries
,
July 21-28, 1969 and
April 21-28, 1969, respectively; also interview of Secretary General of
LDP, Tanaka, as reported in Yomuri Shimbun
,
October 10, 1969 in Daily
,
October 14, 1969, p. 23. In this last source, Tanaka stressed that Japan
would either be protected by international arrangements or she would seek
her own means of defense:
If there should be abrogation (of the Security Treaty) , it
would have to be when something to take the place of the
Security Treaty appears, that is, either autonomous defense
or the establishment of a collective security setup of the
United Nations. WE WILL NOT ADOPT UNARMED NEUTRALITY.
Parentheses and emphasis added.
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degree of mass participation. In one sense, it is the smoke-filled room
image of the American political convention carried to the extreme.
The biggest problem for Japanese foreign policy may well be the closed
1 Q C
nature of this policy-making process. Unless new forms of communication
or access can open the process, each major policy decision will become a
potential crisis in which not only policy but also system viability is
called into question. Any substantial departures from past policy will
generate severe tensions for a status quo Japan, requiring the kind of
dynamic guidance that a conservative government will find great difficulty
in providing. To preserve domestic political continuity, Japan will be
forced to assume a passive role in international politics. Despite an in-
creased potential for autonomous action, a reactive Japan will look to
the external environment for stimuli, awaiting that crossroads where action
or inaction will be equally painful. The nuclear weapons issue in general
or the NPT in particular could precipitate such a crisis.
In discussing either issue, much importance is assigned to Japan's
"nuclear allergy." Born in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this
nuclear pacifism sees atomic weapons as morally repugnant and as the cause
185




Michio Royama, "America's Far Eastern Strategy and Japan's Stand,"
panel discussion, Chuo Koron
,
May, 1968 in Summaries
, May 20-27, 1968, p.
6. The consequences of this kind of policy immobilism have not been lost
on the Japanese. As noted by Royama:
The Japanese Government is quite incapable of 'crisis
management,' which is most important in present-day
strategic thinking. This is why the Government is too
flurried over the Enterprise (port visit) and B-52's to
cope with them properly. If an incident with greater
international meaning breaks out, how much more flur-
ried the Government will be! I shudder at this idea.




of most international unrest. Its adovates are numerous and vocal but the
depth of their influence in 1972 is unclear. About fifty-five percent of
Japan's population is thirty-three or younger, a generation to whom World
War II is more history than personal experience. Conceived in an era of un-
precedented prosperity and genuine security, their allergy is closer to an
intellectual commitment than to an emotional conviction rooted in memories
of wartime devastation. Such a feeling will likely be more vulnerable to
sudden short-run changes in external threat perception while remaining
susceptible to gradual long-term erosion.
This sentiment is, nevertheless, institutionalized for Japan by
Article 9 of her constitution and by her Basic Atomic Energy Law of 1955.
The former is, by any standards, a remarkable document. Created by
enthusiastic Occupation reformers, this "no-war clause" reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding para-
graph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the State will not be recognized. *-°°
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Richard Halloran, "Japan is Losing Aversion to Idea of Nuclear Arms,"
New York Times
,
Dec. 26, 1971, p. 1. A veteran Far East correspondent,
Halloran reports that "many Government officials and industrialists who
keep their fingers on the public pulse here" think Japan's emotional
antipathy "to things nuclear" has all but vanished. The explanation is
simply that "time heals all wounds, even the severe and penetrating
anguish caused by the holocausts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki."
188




By renouncing the right to maintain a war potential, Article 9 chal-
lenges the legality of the SDF. The JSP proclaims this force unconstitu-
tional while the LDP argues such an organization is authorized since the
Constitution does not specifically prohibit defense against aggression.
As shown in the 1970 White Paper, the same reasoning can be theoretically
extended to atomic weapons.
The significance of Article 9 is that it integrates security policy
with the basic law of the land. If the government perceived a sufficient
external threat to demand rearmament, the constitution would have to be
revised. In so doing, Japan would undermine one of the principal pillars
in its postwar political structure; one that to a great extent has been
socialized into her citizenry's value system. Article 9 unquestionably
inhibits general rearmament or the possession of special weapons, but it
also subjects Tokyo's domestic scene to a variety of international pres-
sures from which most countries are insulated.
The Basic Atomic Energy Law is a more specific outgrowth of Article
9 feelings. Paralleled by a similar ordinance for the space program, this
law stipulates that nuclear research be conducted solely for peaceful ends,
that these activities be placed under close parliamentary supervision and
that they remain open for public inspection. Such provisions sound com-
mendable but are not totally feasible in a world where distinctions be-
tween civilian and military programs are more a matter of intent than
capability. As was shown above, a nation cannot develop a modest com-
mercial nuclear industry without going to the brink of weapon production.
The Basic Law law must establish technical guidelines to promote the
former while preventing the latter. The consequence is a piece of
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legislation sanctified by the public but seriously handicapped in its actual
implementation.
A renewal national self-confidence in modern Japan evidenced by many
subtle trends has more tenuous implications for bomb acquisition. Rooted
in the tenacious Japanese family structure, this resurgent nationalism has
been nurtured by Japan's economic and technological success in the postwar
189
period and is subject to varying interpretations. To the Left it"
symbolizes independence from a pervasive American influence which imperils
Japanese sovereignty. For the Right, independence is combined with prestige
and power appeals since this group is more concerned with threats to Japan's
security by a nuclear China. Despite different ideological slants, both
positions contain a common desire for more autonomous action. All sides
are growing increasingly uneasy about the nature of their American alliance.
This new sentiment is less an emotional reaction against security dependence
than a pragmatic assessment of Japan's expanding defense needs. Many
Japanese feel it is not only internally demeaning to entrust most of their
190defense to a foreign power, but that it is also militarily unwise.
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As used in this paper, the Japanese Left will include all the opposition
parties: JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP. The Right refers to most segments of
the LDP.
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,
June 27, 1965. In discussing the
Security Treaty, Genki Abe, former Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police
Board, commented that "to count on another country for vital national
defense is nothing other than abject colonialism. The foundation of
national defense is the firm will to defend one's country by oneself."
As Times correspondent Robert Trumbull noted, Abe stated in print what many
Japanese have been saying in private ever since China's first nuclear test.
For other examples of this feeling, see Tokyo Shimbun
,
March 21, 1966, and
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Furthermore, mobilizing this latent nationalism is probably the only means
of building a nation-wide consensus which would transcend the factional dif-
ferences of Japanese politics. Growing national pride is presently juxta-
posed in a curious fashion with Japan's lingering pacifism; a dramatic change
in Tokyo's perception of an outside threat could quickly upset the balance.
Under such circumstances, nuclear weapons would not only enhance Japanese
security but would also graphically demonstrate her emergence as a great
power, independent from the United States.
If the implications of nationalism are tough to discern, the attitudes
of different interest groups are more readily apparent. Aside from the
formal positions of Japan's political parties, the nuclear issue is likely
to be affected by pressure from three other sources—Japan's businessmen,
scientists and general public. The fact that Japanese industry produces
ninety percent of the SDF's equipment and the growth of vocal defense advo-
cates among Japan's business community are often cited as meaningful
191
rearmament indicators. As mentioned in Chapter IV, these figures are
accurate, but not necessarily significant signs of a budding military-
industrial complex. Of greater current importance than large increases in
the defense budget are the risks a rearmament policy would entail for a
Japan dependent on good-will in East Asia and the United States. Potential
losses in these vast markets easily countervail any immediate business
desire for bigger arms profits, making gradual increases the rule at
present. In addition, Japan's entrepreneurs are wary of the domestic
political hazards posed by rearmament while the omnipotent Finance Ministry
191





frowns on large expenditures in an area which will contribute little to
economic growth. Finally, Japanese industrial interests lack a Pentagon
or equivalent central procurement source within the government which can
effectively press their demands. Although the voice of business is growing,
it will only become relevant after a political decision for rearmament is
made.
192
The opposition of Japan's scientific establishment " to nuclear arms
is well-known and qualitatively important. Mostly physicists and nuclear
engineers, these men are distributed throughout Japan's entire atomic in-
dustry and possess irreplaceable technical skills in their field. A recent
example of their nuclear sensitivity was the fear that government statements
on the NPT were explicitly intended to preserve Japan's weapon option. Yet
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this same group also criticized the Treaty for security shortcomings.
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Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power
,
p. 342. The political sensitivity of this
group is shown by their frequent refusal to cooperate with the United States
on certain projects because of the participation of American officers in
these endeavors, even though the research was not directed to military pur-
poses. For example, the cooperative monitoring of radioactivity proved
difficult to carry out because of objections to participation by technically
qualified members of the American military.
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Position," Mainichi Shimbun
,
Evening edition, February 10, 1970 in Daily
,
February 14-16, 1970, pp. 7-8. Speaking for Japan's scientific community,
Miyake first castigates the government statement upon signing the NPT as
"Japan's having declared its intention to reserve the right to arm itself
with nuclear weapons." He then lists the scientists' somewhat contradictory
preconditions for signing the Treaty: (1) The U.S. and U.S.S.R. must in-
crease their efforts for disarmament; (2) Japan must make a positive
declaration that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons; (3) the
PRC and France must participate in the NPT. Miyake also estimated that
5,000 scientists and technicians would be needed for any nuclear armament




It seems unlikely that the government could mount a special weapons program
without at least the scientist's tacit consent, but they are subject to the
same changes in threat perception as the Japanese public.
Public attitudes on atomic arsenals are generally measured by opinion
polls. Although these surveys generally show a very low percentage of
Japanese favor atomic weapons, their value is open to question for two
reasons. First, citizen response quite logically depends on what question
was asked which in turn reflects the interpellator ' s judgment on relevant
issues and phraseology. Such naively phrased queries as, "Do you favor
nuclear weapons?", grossly oversimplify the problem and seldom appreciate
the context within which any decision would be reached. Second, opinion
surveys assume a level of citizen sophistication and interest in public
affairs which simply does not exist. Because of the public's ignorance of
specific events, polls must necessarily be raised to a level of generality
which inhibits meaningful analysis. Furthermore, tallies intimate that mass
opinions are intensely held and will have a large effect on government
policy. As shown above, both assertions are at best doubtful.
A closer study of opinion polls presents a considerably different pic-
ture than a unanimously anti-nuclear Japan. For instance, a 1969 Mainichi
poll showed that only two percent of Japan favored immediate acquisition of
nuclear weapons but forty-five percent believed their country should
194
eventually possess atomic arms. An earlier survey of postwar youth by
a Japanese psychologist yielded similar results: Three-fourths of the sample




May 12, 1969 in Daily
,




years. These statistics, even without reference to a threatenting inter-
national environment, show a Japanese public increasingly inclined to accept
fission weapons as an undesirable but necessary evil for national survival.
Perhaps it is neither enthusiasm nor revulsion but the sense of inevitably
about this issue that suggests more accurately the limits of popular aversion
to nuclear weapons and the expanding policy latitude open to Japanese leaders.
Despite their faults, the more simplistic "yes or no" nuclear surveys
are often used by the Opposition to demonstrate support for their position.
The avowed stand of all opposition parties, especially the JSP, involves a
vociferous denunciation of arms nuclear arms which appeals to the undif-
ferentiated pacifism of the Japanese public. Beneath this verbal veneer,
however, the JSP has admitted that Japan might reluctantly rearm, even with
196
atomic weapons, if so compelled by international events. Such a stance
implies that unarmed neutrality is the touchstone for Socialist foreign
policy only in a Marxist, Utopian order where all conflict has been elimi-
nated. In today's imperfect world, the odds against this possibility appear
substantial.
Similar idyllic notions have characterized government nuclear policy
197in the postwar era. From 1957 to 1964, Japan worked vigorously for
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absolute control of fission weapons, concentrating on test bans and eventual
complete disarmament. Since Tokyo entertained neither the ambition nor the
capability for nuclear arms, her efforts were directed principally at the
superpowers from the high moral plateau of a nation which had experienced
the horrors of atomic war. Typical of this approach was Japanese government
reaction in September, 1961, when the Soviet Union announced it was breaking
an unofficial superpower test moratorium. The Foreign Ministry maintained
the Soviet decision "not only betrays the earnest prayer of all the people
of Japan, but mercilessly tramples on the prayerful hopes for peace of all
198
peoples who fear war and love peace." This righteous indignation was
vindicated by conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in August, 1963, an
agreement to which Japan promptly adhered.
Today Japan has a definite capability plus some possible justifications
for acquiring nuclear devices. Consequently, LDP policy is privately to keep
options open, publicly to proclaim the "three nuclear no's" and inter-
nationally to work for measures, such as a comprehensive test ban, which
will further circumscribe the primacy of the nuclear powers. The conserva-
tives' public attitude is their most troublesome tactic. It eschews Real-
politic for present political gain, failing to consider that domestic
tranquility may be seriously upset when the LDP must compromise a previously




September 3, 1961, pp. 1-2.
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The government has made some statements mentioning Japan's technical
capability for weapon manufacture. See, for example, Sato's remarks in
Japan Times
, January 12, 1965 and December 5, 1967. Officials believe
that by driving home the idea that Japan has a nuclear alternative, they
are laying a foundation for future acceptance of atomic devices. These
statements, however, are always camouflaged by vocal disclaimers about
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"four nuclear pillars." Their transient quality is indicated by the
Prime Minister's refusal to freeze them into a Diet resolution. Although
Sato protests that he "cannot make any pledge which would bind future
201
cabinets," such moves are simply designed to preserve the government's
freedom of action in dealing with any contingency. Regretably, these
catchy slogans cast nuclear deterrence problems in all-or-nothing terms,
while only a limited number of specialists discuss the technical issues
which would help clarify difficulties peculiar to Japan's strategic situa-
tion. Even these theorists, however, assume that the United States will
remain sufficiently engaged in Asia for Japan to continue her reliance on
American nuclear prowess for the indefinite future. In sum, government
nuclear policy is necessarily ambiguous and frequently contradictory. When
forced to focus on specific questions, it presents a far different image
from the pacifist Japan to which Asia and the rest of the world have grown
accustomed: Nowhere is this pattern more apparent than in Japan's debate
on the NPT.
government intent to procure special weapons. Done to quiet the Opposition,
this tactic obscures the basic message. Instead of acknowledging a subtle
distinction between intent and capability, the average Japanese citizen




February 8, 1968 in Daily , February 24-26, 1968, p. 16;
Mainichi Shimbun
,
March 8, 1968, and Asahi Shimbun , March 6, 1968 in Daily
,
March 8, 1968, pp. 8 and 45, respectively. The remaining three pillars are:
(1) efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament; (2) dependence on the United
States' nuclear deterrent; (3) steps to promote development of the peaceful




February 10, 1968 in Daily , February 14, 1968, p.
20. In more candid moments, Sato has called the Non-Nuclear Declaration "a
kind of dream" or has maintained there was "no need for it." See Yomuri
Shimbun
, January 31, 1968, and February 1, 1968 in Daily , February 1, 1968,
and February 2, 1968, pp. 23 and 41, respectively.
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From 1965 to 1968, Japan's attitude on the proposed Treaty could be
described as one of cautious oppostion. As discussed earlier, Tokyo con-
sistently sided with the non-nuclear powers in demanding a variety of security
202
and economic concessions from the superpowers. Although a majority of
these objections centered on technical issues related to commercial develop-
ments in atomic energy, they also appeared to have a distinct security
rationale. Japan's proposal of a five-year Treaty review to account for
technological advances in the nuclear field is a case in point. In 1968,
Tokyo's civilian nuclear program was not sufficiently developed for Japan
to argue strongly against controls. By the time of the first review, how-
ever, Japan would enjoy the option of pressing for a complete Treaty re-
appraisal on the grounds that indigenous circumstances made existing in-
spection requirements intolerable.
Although most of Japan's pre- 1968 commentary on the NPT was care-
fully measured, a pair of statements revealed the depth of government
concern over Japanese security. One was the December, 1967, speech by
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Japan's ambassador to the United States, Takezo Shimoda; the other was
the Foreign Ministry's Tentative Plan on Attitudes Toward the KPT, published
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April 14, 1967 in Daily , April 15, 1967, p. 4. The suggestions included
concrete nuclear power pledges for disarmament, detailed arrangements for
the peaceful uses of atomic energy including explosive devices, identical
inspection procedures for nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states,
Treaty review every five years to compensate for technological advances
and explicit security guarantees by nuclear nations to Nth countries
threatened or attacked with fission weapons.
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in early 1966. Both statements explicitly link Tokyo's participation in
the Treaty to the actions of Peking. Shimoda warned that Japan's adherence
to the NPT might amount to accepting Chinese suzerainty over all Asia, and
he strongly advocated that Japan's nuclear option should remain open to the
next generation. The Foreign Ministry Plan specifically mentioned the future
threat of Communist China, arguing that Japan should not bind its hands by
prematurely signing the Treaty. Additionally, the Tentative Plan reserved
the right for "nuclear planning" consultations under the NPT, leaving open
the possibility of a Japanese MLF at some later date. To no one's surprise,
both documents inspired heavy Opposition criticism and were subsequently
diluted or dismissed. They represent, however, a frank expression of Japan's
major reservation about the Treaty—it would impair her ability to cope with
any future menace, particularly a nuclear China.
Expressed in milder terms, security worries likewise dominated the
LDP's general criticisms of the NPT:
(1) The NPT was an unequal treaty, giving legal recognition
to the inferior status of non-nuclear powers. It demon-
strated this shortcoming by only applying IAEA safe-
guards to Nth countries and by failing to impose dis-
armament obligations on either superpower.
(2) The Treaty did not provide adequate security guarantees
for non-nuclear countries threatened by nuclear states.
(3) China and France had refused to sign the Treaty, leaving
two nuclear powers unfettered by its commercial or
security restrictions.
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(4) Stringent Treaty inspection requirements might expose some
nations to the risks of industrial espionage, hinder their




The first three reservations were directly related to Japanese security
concerns while the fourth had a more subtle, but no less significant, con-
nection with Tokyo's defense posture. Since all Japan's reactors are cur-
rently inspected by the IAEA, the intensity of her objections to NPT safe-
guards seems peculiar. Not only does the IAEA prohibit its inspectors from
disclosing information to any non-Agency personnel but the examined state
also has an absolute veto over any particular inspector. Perhaps her
traditional diplomatic courtesy prevents Japan from refusing entry to an
inspector merely because she suspects he might reveal industrial secrets; a
more likely reason is that the NPT has substituted an entirely new in-
spection principle, international consensus by treaty, for the simple
rationale of property rights. At present, IAEA checks are a part of bi-
lateral Japanese agreements with the United States, Great Britain and others
which operate on the assumption that the supplier has every right to examine
his product and its intended use. The NPT would expand the present scope of
these inspections to include both imported and domestically produced nuclear
components while justifying their conduct under rigid Treaty standards in
stead of under the more flexible guidelines characteristic of mutually bene-
ficial bilateral arrangements.
205
See the statement of Ambassador Shimoda when he signed the NPT in
Washington on February 3, 1970. Department of State Bulletin LXII, March 2,
1970, pp. 228-9.
or\f.
For further elaboration, see George H. Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear
Non-Prolieration Treaty," Asian Survey
,
X (September, 1970), 770.
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The desire to preserve flexibility was likewise inherent in Japanese
objections to possible Treaty limitations on peaceful nuclear activities.
Government officials maintained that no exchange of information should be
prohibited merely on the grounds that it had military as well as peaceful
applications. Uranium enrichment technology was cited as a specific ex-
ample: Such knowledge made it easier to produce special weapons but should
not be denied as it lowered fuel costs and made atomic power generation more
. . 207
economical.
The complaints listed in category four thus had overt economic appeals
but also contained plausible security motivations. Again, Japan resolutely
denied any military ambitions but simultaneously refused to foreclose her
nuclear alternative. Meanwhile, she capitalized on nationalistic reactions
against the "unequal" Treaty to promote her own "peaceful" atomic energy
programs, moving ever closer to a bomb capability. The government was under-
standably reluctant to sign the NPT on the assumption that Japan's presently
stable security relationship would endure for the Treaty's twenty-five year
life. Even with the Treaty's escape clause, Japan's adherence would create
a moral commitment which would further complicate her local and global
political problems should she withdraw. The LDP's approach to the entire
nuclear issue seems to reflect the belief that "an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure." It is displayed in a unique passion for hedging one's
bets and is not limited to the NPT. For example, in a 1969 statement to the
207
Atsuhiko Yatabe, Chief, Science Section, Foreign Ministry, "A Note on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons: The Japanese Point of View,"
Japanese Annual of International Law
,
No. 14 (1970), 27-28. Privately, many
LDP members endorsed domestic enrichment facilities as much for their potential
value as for their tangible economic benefits. See Mainichi Shimbun
,
September 11, 1969 in Daily , September 20-22, 1969, p. 29.
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Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) of the U.N. , Japan's ambassador
Asakai claimed his government supported the Sea Bed Treaty in principle.
"However, as Japan is surrounded by the sea, it is difficult for us to agree
to the proposal that purely defensive devices against an attack from the sea
should also be prohibited by the treaty."
If the NPT occasioned mild government criticism, it inspired vehement
209
attacks by the Opposition. With exception of the DSP, all opposition
parties denounced the Treaty as an international fraud and threatened drastic
drastic action should the conservatives try to push it through the Diet. The
Opposition listed three major faults of the Treaty: (1) the NPT froze Japan's
client relationship with the United States; (2) without superpower dis-
armament pledges or inspection requirements for nuclear countries, the Treaty
discriminated against non-nuclear powers; (3) it failed to place restrictions
210
either on the superpowers or on non-signator nations such as China. Two
?08
Statement of Ambassador Asakai when Japan first joined the ENDC on July
3, 1969, Documents on Disarmament , 1969
,
p. 312. The Sea Bed Treaty was
designed to prohibit use of the ocean floor for military purposes, speci-
fically nuclear weapons. It was opened for signature on February 11, 1971,
and has since been signed and ratified by over twenty nations, including
Japan.
209
For the DSP position, see article by then Chairman of DSP Foreign Affairs




(June, 1967) in Summaries
,
June 26 - July 3, 1967, p. 42. Al-
though DSP objections to the Treaty roughly parallel those of other oppo-
sition parties, their recommendations are quite different. The Democratic
Socialists urge that Japan join the NPT "for a period of experimental
acceptance," but they specifically link withdrawal to the non-participation
of France and China. These two countries are also mentioned in DSP comments
on the Treaty's insufficient security guarantees. The total picture is that
of an organization more concerned with pure security matters than any
political party outside the right wing of the LDP. Since this party is not
bound by the Liberal Democrats' pro-American stance, its strong defense
orientation might provide a future impetus toward an independent Japanese
military capability.
210
For statements of all opposition parties, see Asahi Shimbun
,
Evening
edition, February 3, 1970, pp. 17-18, and Mainichi Shimbun , September 6,
1969, p. 22, in Daily , February 6, 1970 and September 10, 1969, respectively.
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facts stand out in these statements. First, they parallel the Liberal
Democrat's objections, showing a keen sense of Japanese national interest
regardless of their rhetorical trappings. Indeed, the Opposition generally
abjured criticizing the substance of LDP policy on the NPT, attacking in-
stead the possibility of Japanese adherence out of deference to the United
211
States. Second, they furnish ample reason for an already reluctant con-
servative government to shelve the Treaty issue indefinitely. It would be
sheer folly for the LDP to exhaust its dwindling political capital by fight-
ing for an agreement which the party itself cannot support.
In contrast to the security slant of party protests against the NPT,
business interests dwelt primarily on the Treaty's commercial disadvantages.
The charge of industrial espionage was particularly acute in view of the
IAEA requirement for the review of nuclear plant blueprints before con-
212
struction. The competitive Japanese businessman feared such "instrusive"
demands would increase the likelihood of an information leak, giving his
rivals an unfair jump in the world reactor market. Realizing that Japan's
atomic energy industry is still at a fairly elementary stage, commercial




September 6, 1969 in Daily , September 10, 1969, p. 22.
The Opposition noted conservative complaints about the Treaty's unequal nature
but believed they would eventually sign the accord in order to strengthen
ties with Washington. The JSP and others felt that "even though one (the
LDP) talks about autonomy, it is no more than the autonomy of running the
opposite direction within a train."
212
rThis provision is now regarded as necessary to allow proper inspection
and accounting procedures to be applied to nuclear installations after con-
struction has been completed.
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development. Even now Japanese industrialists complain about the frequency
213
and thoroughness of IAEA inspectors, grumbling that routine plant closures
for their activities will prove economically disastrous and needlessly
interrupt electricity generation. In point of fact, these concerns seem
overstated, appearing more symbolic than substantive. First, the IAEA
specifically cautions its inspectors against interfering with plant opera-
tions. Second, it will be several years before Japan will produce a com-
mercially competitive reactor for export. Even then inspection requirements
can be altered at the first Treaty review conference. Finally, with the
rapid development of nuclear technology, secrecy on inventions will be
valuable for only a short time and the risks of damage resulting from leaks
will be correspondingly small. More likely in a competitive market,
advertising rather than secrecy will be the normal rule for sellers. Regard-
less of their validity, these admonitions, at a minimum, give the industry-
conscious conservatives cause for considerable procrastination.
To date such delays have been the government's watchword. Seen in this
light, Japan's Treaty signature in February, 1970, was mainly a shrex<rd tactical
move dictated by external circumstances. It was foremost a necessary reci-
procal gesture for the promised American return of Okinawa. After casting
her lot with the non-nuclear powers during negotiation, Japan's action was
also an appropriate follow-up to the Federal Republic of German's signature
213
See, for example, a formal protest to MITI and the Foreign Ministry by
the Federation of Electrical Power Companies over shutdown of Japan's
Tsuruga power station. Nuclear Engineering
, May 1971, p. 371. Reactor
shutdown is often necessary to measure accurately plutonium output or to
calculate how much uranium is in the reactor core. Such checks, however,
normally coincide with normal plant closure for maintenance and refueling
operations. For a sample of more general complaints about the frequency
IAEA inspections, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun
, January 26, 1970 in Daily
,




in December, 1969. Furthermore, by signing the Treaty just before it
entered into force, Japan could participate in upcoming Article III negoti-
ations, thereby pressing her safeguard demands more effectively. Finally,
if Tokyo had simply let the NPT become official, she would need to "accede"
at a later date. That is, the government would have to sign and ratify in
one operation without the political flexibility of the February signing
maneuver.
Upon signing the NPT on February 3, 1970, Japan issued a statement
detailing all her previous reservations: neither China nor France were
signators; the Treaty should not hamper peaceful nuclear activities; the
superpowers needed to make greater disarmament progress; the implementation
of security guarantees would be closely monitored; safeguards must be
215
simple, rational and uniformly applied. Two passages of the Foreign
Ministry's declaration tied Japanse ratification directly to these last
three points.
The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this
Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in
disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation
of the Security Council Resolution on the security of non-
nuclear weapon States and continue to make a close study
of other problems which require consideration for the safe-
guarding of her national interests. ^-*-°
214
The Japanese press consistently linked West Germany's participation with
that of Japan. In May, 1969, Sato and Chancellor Kiesinger in effect sanc-
tioned this speculation by agreeing that the "two countries will promote
consultation and cooperation on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," See
Asahi Shimbun , May 20, 1969, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun , May 20, 1969 in
Daily





, pp. 2-5; Asahi Shimbun , February 4, 1970
in Daily
,
February 4, 1970, p. 3; Mainichi Shimbun, February 4, 1970 in
Daily
,
February 5, 1970, pp. 1 and 2-3, respectively.
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The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article
III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to
disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards
agreements which other states parties conclude with the same
agency, either individually or together with other states.
The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration
to this matter before talcing steps to ratify the Treaty. x
11 Q
With this series of qualifications, it appears doubtful that Japan
will ever adhere to the NPT. The real danger in this situation is that
pressure from Washington or internal events may push the Treaty into the
center of Japan's domestic political stage. If caught in interparty and
intraparty factional struggles, the NPT will be defined, not in international
terms, but under conditions relevant to Japan's peculiar domestic milieu.
The Opposition will be forced to create ad hoc rationalizations for defeat





p. 4. Foreign Minister Aichi subsequently stated that Japan must
receive "Euratom-Level" safeguards before she will ratify the NPT. See
Asahi Shimbun
,
February 3, 1970 in Daily , February 13, 1970, p. 12. Japan




January 27, 1970, in Daily , January 28, 1970, p. 2. As
the only major Japanese paper favoring the NPT, Tokyo Shimbun was particu-
larly leery of these non-specific government objections to the Treaty:
If the LDP proposes such questions (about NPT implications
for Japan's security, for peaceful atomic energy, etc.) from
its position as the ruling Party, it will have a responsi-
bility to classify the contents of such questions concretely.
This kind of question, which is like a puzzle, cannot but
deepen our suspicion that those who are calling for caution
toward the signing of the Treaty have an intention, in fact,
to arm ourselves with nuclear weapons and that they have
called for caution in order to camouflage such an intention.
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turn, will likely be immersed in a factional battle in which each habatsu
leader would use the Treaty as an expedient stepping stone to enhance his
personal power. Since opposition from every party revolves about similar
219
questions of Japanese security and sovereignty, an exhausting fight
against Treaty ratification would commit all elements to a fundamentally
anti-pacifist, independent position in world affairs. If a sudden crisis
should force a change in external threat perception, the pacifist Opposi-
tion would be caught with their moral momentum going in the wrong direction.
In short, the NPT could become a political football in a game where touch-
down means a nuclear Japan.
219
Mainichi Shimbun , September 15, 1969 in Daily , September 30, 1969, p.
30, 1969, p. 30. In the concluding paragraph of its fifteen article series
on the NPT, Mainichi pinpointed this relationship between Treaty opposition
and nuclear incentives:
In the final analysis, it is the Japanese people who will
decide ultimately Japan's nuclear policy. In this respect,
it is worth noting that in our country today, there seem
hardly any views in any circles positively supporting the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Can it not be said that
we can see a psychological basis for the emergence of a
national consensus in this fact? And, will this not be-
come linked with a good opportunity for the formulation of
an 'autonomous' nuclear policy?








Study of the balance sheet gives at least even odds that Japan will be-
come a nuclear power in the 1970' s. Incentives for weapon acquisition are
strong and increasing. Nuclear arms would be potent prestige symbols,
giving a status-conscious Japan political power commensurate with her
economic prowess. The continued growth of China's arsenal demands a counter-
vailing capability. Washington's withdrawal from the Far East casts the
American deterrent in an uncertain light. Technological advances continu-
ally narrow the gap between peaceful and civilian nuclear efforts. A
nuclear Japan would enjoy the dual security benefits of absolute control
over her destiny and of new power in a previously punchless foreign policy.
The obstacles to atomic arms are equally powerful but in many cases are
waning. Violent opposition to such a move from public, press, business and
the scientific community promises unprecedented internal turmoil. The cost
of special weapons would hinder Japan's economic growth. Legal constraints
—
Article 9, the Basic Atomic Energy Law and the Test Ban Treaty—are compelling
moral barriers. The vulnerability of any Japanese force de frappe might
render it strategically useless. A fearful Asia might react by isolating
Tokyo from its vital markets. Nuclear devices would irrevocably establish
an adversary relationship between Japan and the PRC.
The next few years will be a period of transition and preparation for
Japan. She will continue rocket development and peaceful atomic programs,
keeping technical options open while accumulating human and material re-
sources to cope with future contingencies. Should the international situa-
tion require it, Japan could then develop a nuclear capability with con-
siderable speed at a time when domestic attitudes would be more receptive.
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This technological advance in itself will provide a powerful push toward
special weapons development. The renunciation of atomic arms is not a
difficult policy decision when no capability to produce them exists and
when no serious challenge, political or military, is present. An altera-
tion in either condition produces greater inducements for fission devices,
a change in both generates an almost inescapable momentum toward nuclear
development. The dynamics of this process are unmistakable: Any political
decision for weapons manufacture cannot be taken unless the technical
capacity exists; the existence of technology alone makes a weapons decision
easier to reach; the presence of an external threat merely makes an affirma-
tive decision more likely. Incremental technological gains are clearly
moving Japan in this direction, and political factors, though less apparent,
also seem to be aiding the advance. It is not without significance that a
Japanese Foreign Ministry study of the merits and demerits of joining the
220
NPT failed to note a single merit in foregoing national nuclear arsenals.
At any time, specific world events, such as a security crisis in Korea
or Taiwan, might sufficiently jeopardize Japanese interests to propel her
toward a nuclear course. Certainly Japan's political system breeds a type
of reactive foreign policy which makes her uniquely susceptible to these
external upheavals. More likely is a steady buildup of political pressures
forcing a decision in the late seventies. Japan's increased suspicion of
a nuclear China, a desire for more independence from the United States and
the wish for greater political influence will probably grow in the next
several years, and, unless Asia experiences a dramatic transition from
220,,
Merits and Demerits of Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty," Asahi Shimbun
,
October 13, 1969 in Daily , October 10-13, 1969, p. 30,
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President Nixon's 'era of confrontation to one of negotiation,' such in-
ducements may soon become irresistable to Japan. Their compelling nature
derives from the fact that all these incentives are, directly or in-
directly, related to Japanese security. As illustrated by debate over the
NPT, Tokyo is deeply concerned about the need for a reliable nuclear shield
to insure Japan's security and to protect her national interests. Although
seldom clearly addressed, one major issue for the Japanese was the crede-
bility of Washington's deterrent as embodied in the Security Treaty. If
the Security Treaty was accepted as providing adequate defense guarantees,
it would have been pointless to criticize the NPT for not furnishing Japan
with reliable strategic protection. Yet Tokyo opposed the Treaty on pre-
cisely these grounds.
In broader terms, the NPT debate within Japan showed her leader's
growing uneasiness over the present nature of their American alliance.
Even if a mutual military need exists, the maintenance of any alliance
usually requires a convergence of interests that goes well beyond a common
desire for security. In the past, American preponderance in Asia has
mitigated the need for such a convergence. If the Security Treaty is to
remain viable in the future, Japan must perceive a United States willingness
to risk conventional or even nuclear war with China in defense of Japanese
interests for reasons other than simple territorial integrity. The American
commitment must apply to the full range of Japan's current regional
endeavors and must not be subject to deterioration when China's strategic
force becomes capable of striking the United States. Given present trends
of the Nixon Doctrine, such a future guarantee is at best unlikely. This
development implies that Tokyo's client defense relationship with Washington
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must eventually change to accommodate each nation's divergent interests.
It is the timeless question of old myths and new realities:
There is nothing constant in the universe; all ebb and
flow, and every shape that is born bears in its womb
the seeds of change.
Ovid , Metamorphoses
In relations between states as in those between humans, there are few con-
stants. The Security Treaty is a rigid clamp on a fluid situation. • It
reflected reality in the bipolar era of the 1950's, but, in its present
form, the Treaty can no longer accommodate Japan's evolving interests.
The NPT's major shortcoming is that it forces Japan's continued
reliance on the Security Treaty as a means of defense for all her interests.
But the Security Treaty itself is relevant only in those instances when
American and Japanese interests are identical by chance or when Japan is
under direct attack. The Security Treaty and NPT security assurances pro-
vide reliable protection only for the most basic Japanese interest—survival.
The United States has exacerbated Japan's anxiety by pressuring her to
adopt mutually incompatible positions: a greater military role in Asia under
the NixonDoctrine and participation in the NPT. At the very time when
economic problems are widening the gap between both nations, Washington is
asking Tokyo to raise its conventional military posture in the Far East
while abandoning its nuclear option for exclusive reliance on American
strategic might. The assumption underlying White House strategy is that
Japan's response to present political problems will parallel her quick,
rational adjustment to past economic difficulties. This approach ignores
the dynamics of Japanese politics as well as the nature of the desired
objectives. The concrete goal of maximizing profits is vastly different
from the ambiguous aims of security and national sovereignty.
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Since Japan's legitimate national interests extend well beyond the
home islands, future Chinese actions will be her greatest worry. Yet Vietnam
has demonstrated the limited utility of American military power to counter
a Chinese-style war of national liberation. As one Indian observer noted:
...the naval, air, and nuclear power of the United States
is by itself no answer to subversion or guerrilla warfare;
no answer to an infantry push by the Chinese; no answer to
a limited use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Chinese
artillery; no answer to the score raids and no answer to
blackmail.
...But these are precisely the contingencies which the
Chinese are likely to create in the near future. They
will not create contengencies in which U.S. power is a
relevant deterrent . 221
The unavoidable conclusion is that United States' power, nuclear and
to a lesser extent conventional, is not a relevant asset for dealing with
conflict in East Asia. The Nixon Doctrine is in one sense a recognition of
American inability to counter limited, local threats throughout the Far
222
East. Its explicit message is an increased emphasis on strategic
strength; its implicit corollary is that Washington will tolerate a higher
level of regional conflict in Asia. Subsequent American actions have merely
reaffirmed the same theme: The United States will no longer make an auto-
matic military response to communist insurgencies in Asia. For Japan the
implications are ominous, if uncertain. They do insure, however, that her
221




The Japanese government has also recognized this fact. See "Japanese
Defense Policy" Survival
,
p. 3. In the words of the Defense White Paper;
The development of strategic nuclear weapons systems and
the global collective security arrangements in various
parts of the world prevent the outbreak of large-scale
wars. But this has not been instrumental in deterring




perception of the Chinese threat will be locked into an inverse relationship
with American presence in the Far East. Not only will Japan's threat per-
ception increase with the absolute rise of China's military potential, but
it will also grow as Washington achieves a lower Asian profile.
Unless the United States discards the Nixon Doctrine and remains sub-
stantially engaged in Asia, Japan must eventually decide to "fish or cut
bait" in international politics. This decision and the circumstances under
which it is reached will determine Japan's possession of nuclear weapons.
If she desires firm control of her destiny, Japan must participate in the
drama of power politics for which strategic arms are a vital prerequisite.
It seems doubtful that Japan will entrust indefinitely the military protec-
tion of her national interests to the United States or to the vicissitudes
of a military balance controlled by others. It is likewise incredulous
that Japan can attain the status of a great power unless she provides her-
self with the military might that such a status has required in the past.
If Tokyo succeeds in avoiding these demands, the world may well witness the
coming of a millennium in international relations. Yet Japan's present
ostrich approach, by continuing to neglect great power responsibilities,
could also have disasterous consequences for global peace. In any event,
current security imperatives and Japan's long-term national interests seem
to compel her active participation in international affairs. Japan today
is a ship adrift in the turbulent waters of world politics. To steady her-





Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Entered Into Force March 5, 1970
^(Signature at Washington, and on July 1, 1968, unless otherwise indicated.
States xtfhich have deposited their instruments of ratification are under-















































































































Syria (M)** (9/24/69) (M)**
Togo (2/26/70)
Trinidad & Tobago 8/20/68
Tunisia (2/26/68)
Turkey 1/28/69
United Arab Republic (M-L)**
United Kingdom (11/27/68)








Yemen Arab Republic 9/23/68
(M)**
Yugoslavia 7/10/68 (3/4/70)
"The United States has not accepted notification of the signature,
nor of the deposit of ratification instrument, in Moscow, of the "German
Democratic Republic."
**Denotes place of signature (or, if after parenthesized date,
deposit) as follows:
(M) in Moscow only.
(L) in London only.
(ML) in Moscow and London.
+ Denotes instrument of accession.
$ Government not recognized by the United States
Total: 97 Signatures (88 of which were in Washington, D.C.)
63 Deposits (57 of which were in Washington, D.C.)
Sources: U.S. Dept. of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Tenth Annual Report to Congress
,
(January 1, 1970—December
31, 1970) Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office,
1971), pp. 41-42.
. Eleventh Annual Report to Congress (January
1, 1971 - December 31, 1971) (Washington, D.C: Government




United States Declaration on Security Assurances
to Non-Nuclear Nations, June 17, 1968
The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire
expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
The United States also notes the concern of certain of these States
that in conjunction with their adherence to the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safe-
guard their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear
weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the United States declares the
following:
Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression,
against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation
in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security
Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to
remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations
Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the
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prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Therefore, any State
which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which
threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered
effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations
Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.
The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action
to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-
weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
that is a victim of an aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in
which nuclear weapons are used.
The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized
under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence
if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.
The United States vote for the draft resolution before us and this
statement of the way in which the United States intends to act in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the
draft resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security
Council which are nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that these States
have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in
accordance with the Charter.
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Prospect of Primary Energy Sources (in units of 10 " kcal)
1967 1975 1980
Type of Energy Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent
Water power 17.1 8.3 22.2 6.6 26.4 4.4
Nuclear power .0 8.0 2.4 60.1 10.0
Coal 50.6 24.6 55.1 16.3 56.5 9.5
Domestic coal (29.6) (14.6) (31.4) (9.3) (31.4) (5.3)
Oil 132.8 64.7 246.2 72.8 446.9 74.8
Imported (125.1) (60.8) (222.1) (65.6) (431.8) (72.2)
Others (natural
gas, charcoal,
etc. ) 5.0 2.4 6.9 1.9 7.8 1.3
Domestic (4.9) (2.3) (5.1) (1.4) (4.8) (0.8)
Totals 205.5 100.0 338.4 100.0 597.7 100.0
Domestically
produced energy 52.4 25.5 59.6 17.6 63.5 10.6
Imported energy 153.1 74.5 278.8 82.4 534.2 89.4
Source: Nihon no Anzen Hosho . 1970 e no Tenbo. 1969 edition. Tokyo,
1969, p. 252. (Japan's Security. Outlook on 1970). Projections
made by the Overall Energy Survey Countil cited in Emmerson, Arms
,
Yen & Power, p. 326.
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Future Outlook of Japan's Power Generating Capacity (In Megawatts electric
power, Mwe)
1970 1975 1980 1985* 1990
Hydro 18,700 24,000 32,900 45,000 58,400
Fossil 37,000 75,000 91,200 121,000 105,800
Nuclear 1,300 9,000 27,000 60,000 119,700
Total 57,000 108,000 151,000 226,000 283,9 00
Sources: 1) Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Atoms in Japan , September
1970 Supplement: United States Atomic Energy Commission,
American Embassy, Tokyo, cited in Emmerson, Arms , Yen &
Power, p. 326.
2) Interim Report (Draft) of Overall Energy Dept. , May 31, 1971
in Summaries
,
June, 1971, p. 62.
^Figures in this column are taken from source //2 as it reflects a more recent
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Trade of East Asian Countries with Japan as a Percentage of Their Total Trade











Burma 12.4 15.2 39.3 24.2
Cambodia 6.6 21.5 20.3 28.0










150.7 19.1 471.7 52.7
251.9 34.7 146.6 22.1
101.6 22.1 602.7 46.1
343.4 30.6 104.5 15.9
398.0 48.3 411.1 32.1
61.8 20.6 209.3 21.2
147.0 34.4 365.5 35.8














North Vietnam and North Korea have been omitted because trade data with
Communist nations is incomplete. Laos has been omitted because it is not
statistically significant.
b
As reported by Japan.
c
Preliminary reports indicated that Japan had become the leading trading
partner of both the Philippines and Nationalist China in 1970.
Sources: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, Direction of Trade Annual 1963-1967 : Direction and Trade
,
June 1968, August 1968, February 1969, March 1969, April 1969, May 1969, June
1969, September 1969, November 1969, February 1970; Far Eastern Economic Review
Yearbook
, 1969, cited in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Confrontation with Real-
politik," in Balanced Defense : A Forecast of Japan's Security Policy to the





(1) Position of Defense Production in Industrial Production (100 million
yen - %)


































(a) This column contains special procurement.




















































*1, 419, 900 0.85
*The prospect for 1975 under the New Economic and Social Development Plan.
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(3) Overwhelming Weight of Mitsubishi (1969): 100 million yen - %
Sum of money Rate to Total of























701.3 30.9 7,072.5 9.9
214.1 9.5 2,159.5 9.9
191.7 8.5 3,365.9 5.4
113.6 5.0 3,761.3 3.0
59.0 2.6 1,957.0 3.0
47.5 2.1 5,502.0 0.9
38.2 1.7 6,750.8 0.6
36.4 1.6 2,076.4 1.8
28.2 1.2 -
23.8 1.1 2,564.3 0.1
23.5 1.0 326.1 7.2
23.3 1.0 403.6 5.8
23.1 1.0 975.9 2.4
22.6 1.0 -
21.8 1.0 904.8 12.4
17.9 0.8 1,179.1 1.5
17.9 0.8 144.7 2.4
17.9 0.8 1,948.8 0.9
16.5 0.7 575.2 2.9
16.2 0.7 1,194.2 1.4
(Note) a/b is the rate of contracts to the total of sales, and not the rate
of the defense production amount to the total of sales.
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